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Christianity and Society

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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WINTER FELLOWSHIP MEETING

at Labor Temple, 242 East 14th Street, New York City
DECEMBER 27 - 28

Wednesday

Afternoon—Discussion of the Racial Issue
led by Herbert King

Evening—The Prospects for the Progressive Movement in the Immediate Future of the United States by Raymond Walsh, Educational Director of the C. I. O., and Dr. Dwight Bradley, of the Religious Department of the C. I. O.

Thursday

Morning—Communion Service led by Dr. Edward E. Tate, of Alexandria Theological Seminary, Alexandria, Virginia.
Discussion of Fellowship Principles.

Afternoon—Dr. Norman Sibley will lead a panel on "The Task of the Christian Socialist Preacher."

Evening—Dr. John Kroner will open the evening with Meditation.
The evening will be given to Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr on his views of the International Situation.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

Volume 10 Number 1

Dumbarton Oaks

If history only moved a little more in conformity with our ideals. Every previous plan and blueprint for world order contained better guarantees of international justice than Dumbarton Oaks. But almost all of them left out an important consideration. That was that the great powers, whose comparative strength in the international community has grown appreciably through the mechanization of modern warfare, were not likely to abridge their sovereignty in favor of a great world system. What they have done at Dumbarton Oaks is to pool their power for a joint hegemony of the world. They have placed restrictions upon their power only insofar as their mutual arrangements restrict it. This is not a new form of the Pax Brittanica for that was maintained by manipulating a balance of power rather than by using preponderant power for the preservation of order. This is an attempt to create a Pax Romana, with three, rather than one, empires in the role of the coercing power.

As it stands it does not however have the same chances of success as the Pax Romana. There is first of all a considerable difference between a highly cohesive single empire as the source of authority and a coalition of three powers. The first peril to future peace lies in the rivalries of the great powers. These rivalries have been sufficiently composed to make an alliance possible; but not sufficiently to make agreement upon a real organization of the world possible. Dumbarton Oaks for instance provides for regional arrangements which could easily turn into spheres of influence, each of which would be managed by one of the great powers. There is no provision in the agreement for a real reorganization of either Europe or Asia. Both continents are likely to be divided so that portions of each will fall into the orbit of each of the great powers.

The second danger of Dumbarton Oaks lies in the powerlessness of the smaller nations. They have been given only the most minimal authority in their assembly. Even the six who will be elected to the security council will not be able to function in the joint military staff of that council. This is really a grand alliance and not a world organization. It was rather silly to introduce the idea of the alliance with a preamble announcing that it was based upon the principle of the "free and equal sovereignty of all nations." If this is equality one wonders what inequality would look like.

Fortunately the powerlessness of the smaller nations is one defect in the charter which may yet be corrected. The smaller nations will protest against it; and they have enough power to resist their complete political disfranchisement. They still have the power to refuse adhesion to the pact. They will no doubt threaten to do so as Switzerland and Uruguay have already done. We may expect a considerable improvement of the past before it finally becomes the pattern of world order.

Despite its weaknesses the general outline of world order at Dumbarton Oaks must be accepted. Here we face one of the great spiritual problems of our age. We know as individuals that the plan is not sufficient to guarantee peace; but we do not know this as nations. The nations of the world, despite the tragedies of the war, have not been shaken to their foundations. They have not been shaken to the point of real repentence. One might raise the question whether nations ever are. The prophets seemed to think that the recalcitrance of nations against God's will was so stubborn that they question of "how long" the punishment would last could only be answered "until their cities are destroyed" and they lie completely in ruins. The ruins of this war are very considerable. But the great nations are not going to be persuaded to submit their pride and power to a government of the world. We must therefore do the best we can. We must accept their willingness to create areas of mutuality wider than they have prevoiusly accepted. We must gratefully accept their desire to bridge the chasm which divides Russia from the west. We must hope that historical forces will extend the stability of the partnership of the great powers, will overcome the vestiges of mutual fear which still remain and will gradually create larger constitutional implements of justice.

But we must of course also be prepared for the possibility that none of these things will happen. The alliance between the great powers may disintegrate and the smaller powers may find ways of defying the superior power of the great nations which they could not check. There is in other words no guarantee of world peace in Dumbarton Oaks. There is a possibility of peace in our time in it and further possibility of something better being built. But the alternate possibility is also there.

The historical resources for a final solution of the problem of world community are, in short, not available. This is not altogether surprising; for the problem is the greatest which mankind has ever faced. And yet it is tragic that this is so; for the consequences of world anarchy are so terrible and so obvious that one could have imagined a greater willingness to draw the right conclusions. The human imagination, particularly the imagination of collective man, is so limited and the moral inertia and complacency so great that even the greatest tragedies of history do not quite shatter it.

* *

Russia and the Post-War World

Several facts are beginning to emerge quite clearly in regard to Russia. It is clear that national power is a more dominant motive of its policy than revolution. The communists parties stand on the right of all the united front parliamentary developments in the emancipated nations. They seek desperately to reassure the apprehension of the conservative classes in those countries. For Stalin has made up his mind that he wants Russia to have a powerful influence in the nations of Europe; and he will do nothing to alienate either the church or the bourgeoisie or any other traditional force. He feels that German occupation has produced a colonial mentality in all European nations and that he can therefore conform to Lenin's dictum that the nationalistic preoccupations of oppressed colonial peoples must be understood and not antagonized. Thus the Russian nationalism can find proof texts for its policy in the Marxist scripture.

Another interesting fact is that the communist parties, though they want parliamentary governments to be established, also want more power in those governments than it is the inclination of the other parties to give. In France and Belgian at the present moment the communists are using the prestige they gained in the underground to try to prevent the disarmament of their cohorts. They will not easily conform to the parliamentary regimes which they help to set up. Nationalist Russia is, in other words, using the remnants of its revolutionary prestige and the immense authority established by the party in the underground, to secure special favours. While Russia wants very special consideration in eastern Europe, it seems unwilling to disavow its position in any part of Europe. Though we can not build a stable world order without Russia, it is obvious that it will not be easy to build one with Russia.

It would be a great deal easier to do so if the western nations were not so afraid of revolutionary ferment in the liberated nations. These fears constantly play into the Russian hands. We are warned on every side that we must not deliver Europe into the arms of Russia. But those who issue the warning do not recognize that we can not prevent such an eventuality merely by defying Russia. The fact is that Russia has tremedous advantages over us in the game in Europe. The one advantage is geographic propinquity and ethnic affinity with many of the peoples of Europe. The other advantage lies in the fact that she is ready to use, while we try to suppress, revolutionary ferment. Europe is bound to be radical. It is rather sad that the wealthy democracies will try to build Europe in their image. It can not be done.

It is hardly likely that Europe wants to be under Russian dominion either; or that it desires a totalitarian communism. Europe wants both freedom and security and will seek tortuously to achieve these two, partly contradictory and partly supplementary, ends amidst ruin and destruction. It could be helped greatly by the western democracies if they could rise above their own prejudices and capitalistic interests. But nations do not find it easy to do this. That is why Europe will have to work out its salvation with not too much aid from either Russia or the west; but with a more intimate relation with Russia than with us.

* *

Law and Humility

The present international situation clarifies one problem of Christian doctrine. It has been the thesis of both Catholic moralists and Christian liberals that the primary contribution of the Christian faith to the solution of a moral and political issue must be its insistance on the primacy of the moral law and the sovereignty of God. The assumption behind this thesis is that evil comes into the world primarily as explicit self-will and as overt defiance of law and order. But it is becoming increasingly obvious that the real difficulty in establishing a genuine accord between the nations arises from the covert prejudices of people who have no question about the moral law. Catholic internationalists preach the supremacy of law but they find it difficult to deal with the power-political impulses of Russia with any sense of humility, that is with any sense of the fact that Russian impulses, if they do differ in degree, do not differ in kind from the impulses toward unilateral security and domination in the other great nations. Norman Thomas believes

in moral law too but when he discusses the British empire he does so from a utopian level which obscures the fact that one may find egoistic corruption in the imperial policy of every nation. Christian liberals believe in the law of love but they can covertly insinuate the most intolerable national pride into their strictures of other nations; so that one might imagine that America represents a fixed point of virtue from which all other nations are judged.

A decent accord between nations, as any decent accord between individuals, depends partly upon the willingness of all parties to the accord to acknowledge some standard of justice beyond their interest. But it also depends upon humble recognition of the fact that each side is likely to define that standard in terms of its interest and to defy it when its interests are imperiled. If it is understood that our side is tempted to this corruption as well as the other side, the mood of humility is created which makes a give and take of political adjustment possible. Without it men are always in the fury of self-righteousness and thus unable to consider the other viewpoint.

Builders on an international order might well ponder the relevance of the Pauline words: "Behold thou art called a Jew and resteth in the law and makest thy boast to God. And knowest his will and approvest the things that are more excellent, being instructed out of the law; and art confident that thou thyself art a guide to the blind, a light to them that are in darkness. Thou therefore that teachest another, teachest thou not thyself? and that preachest a man should not steal, dost thou steal?"

Election Insights on our Civilization

A consistent pattern of election returns has developed in America in recent years, which throws significant light upon the problems of our civilization. Every night after election, as the returns come in, the important question is whether the democratic majority in New York City has overwhelmed the Republican majority in the state; and whether Detroit votes have overcome the Republican majority in up-state Michigan and Chicago votes have been enough to destroy the Republican majority in down-state Illinois; and whether Cleveland and Cincinnati have overcome the rest of Ohio. (Ohio was lost to Roosevelt this year because Cincinnati was the only large city in the nation which gave Dewey a majority.)

What does this preponderance of democratic votes in the city and of republican votes in the country mean? The Republican party has been, since the days of Abraham Lincoln, an alliance between the farmers and the newer industrial and financial classes. Roosevelt has been able to make the democratic party sufficiently liberal to add the votes of the great city masses to those of the old south. He gained the farmer votes in 1932 but they have since turned to their original allegiance because they do not like the New Deal policies, designed to establish greater governmental control over economic processes.

The alliance between the farmers and the big city industrialists has frequently been termed an unnatural one. It is unnatural in the sense that the comparatively poor are allied with the rich and privileged. Yet it is also a natural alliance, which may last for a long time. It is the alliance of those who have the moderate security of the soil and those who have the security of a privileged position in the vast complexities of a technical society, against those who feel very insecure within the hazards of the

modern industrial process and who therefore demand that government regulate the process in the interest of greater security. The farmer has, or thinks he has, a measure of security because he stands partly outside the process. Unless it breaks down completely, as in 1930, he feels secure and follows the traditional mores of rugged individualism. He wants to be left alone. He hates price control or any other kind of control. He thinks his own diligence is the only final security; though of course he is raising food for a world market and a maladjustment in the machinery of world trade might easily destroy him.

The privileged members of the urban community do not like governmental controls partly because they have sufficient skill and privilege to feel themselves secure against any eventuality. But the millions which are poured into Republican campaign chests are furnished by the very privileged and very powerful who do not want political power to check their economic power. They use the slogans of Jeffersonian liberalism to protect a kind of economic power which Jefferson never wanted to arise and thought he could prevent by keeping America within the confines of agrarianism. There is something very ludicrous about these Jeffersonian Republicans. For the greatest achievement of the New Deal was the discovery that what Jefferson intended as security for the common man, must be gained not by absence of control but by wise control of the economic process.

The alliance between southern democrats and northern workers in the Democratic party is thus a more unnatural one than that between farmers and industrials in the Republican party. In this election labor took over the direction of the campaign to a larger degree than ever before. It is silly to talk of the danger of pressure groups. Labor has merely fashioned its own political power inside the democratic party. Many of the big cities were organized for the first time, not by corrupt and now partly moribund political machines, but by labor organizations. Labor is more than a pressure group. It is one of the most significant of the groups in a modern industrial society without whose intelligent political action no democracy can survive.

If labor had founded its own party it would have been defeated. Yet it can not permanently maintain this alliance. For the southern reactionaries are in some ways more inimical to the interests of the city masses than the western farmers, many of whom have radical leanings and express themselves in terms of radical Republicanism. Labor won the election; but it will not have an unambiguous instrument of its policies in the administration. Roosevelt will continue to be the most dextrous and versatile politician who ever sat in the White House. He has been able to combine the incompatible better than any previous American statesman. But obviously even his skill would not have sufficed to hold the present alliance together if it had not been for the war. And after the war it is bound to collapse. That is why there are bound to be new political alignments after the war. The progressive forces are supporting the fourth term with fewer illusions than ever before, despite their hard work to defeat Dewey. They have become quite realistic to the point of cynicism. And they are not likely to make many compromises for the sake of party loyalty. For they do not even belong to the party. In New York State they voted 800,000 strong in other than the democratic party.

Reason and Interest in Politics

One of the pre-election polls announced that college graduates were in favor of Dewey two to one while the faculties of various institutions were for Roosevelt a little better than two to one. This gives a very nice, and somewhat pathetic picture of the relevance of a college education to the political and moral issues of our day.

We do not assume of course, that amidst the ambiguities of political alternatives, every intelligent man ought to vote for our side. But it is a fact that one of the great problems of our day, is how to gain a measure of security amidst the vast complexities of a technical society and how to gain a measure of justice in opposition to the trend of centralized economic power which inheres in the technical process. It is also a fact that in America the individualistic traditions of the past are a primary hazard to the achievement of these ends. American wealth and security have been so great that eighteenth century illusions about the possibility of achieving justice by an unregulated economic process have a more stubborn inertia among us than in any other western nation. It is also true that on the whole the social and political scientists of our colleges and universities have a fair understanding of the new situation in a technical society which requires a larger measure of social control of the economic process. They have tried to help their students to understand that "new occasions teach new duties, time makes ancient truth uncouth." Usually these undergraduates have stood well to the left of the professors in their undergraduate days. But they vote two to one for Dewey after they become established as more or less privileged members of a privileged class of owners and managers in our industrial process.

Mr. Dewey believed or pretended to believe during the campaign that depressions are like "acts of God" in the world of nature. They usually last about five years, he declared, if you leave them alone. Mr. Roosevelt refused to leave the depression alone and prolonged it to last over a decade, he declared. Such reasoning applies the logic of a crude medicine man to one of the most tragic aspects of our time. For the fact is that neither Britain nor American were able to overcome technological unemployment until a war economy absorbed the unemployed; and the close of the war will confront us anew with this unsolved problem. We will have to have a market of 150 billion if we want to maintain full employment; and we must provide that market for our goods without producing instruments of war and paying for them by mounting debts. That is a large order which can not be solved by the mere removal of war-time restraints. Every modern industrial nation faces the specter of depression about three or four years after the war, that is, as soon as war savings have been used up to pay for unsatisfied consumer wants, dammed up by a war economy.

It does not take much intelligence to recognize how serious this problem is. But the more educated members of our community were not intelligent enough to understand this fact. The reason they were not intelligent enough was because their reason was a servant of their interest. They talked nonsense about free enterprise because they have a privileged position in the free enterprise system, which they do not want to yield. Economic determinists may be wrong if they insist that interest determines all of our moral and political attitudes. There is, thank God, some power and

inclination in men to rise above their interests. But rationalists are equally wrong if they imagine that intelligence alone will solve our moral and political problems. For intelligence is corrupted by interest.

When one contemplates these facts one thanks God for democracy which gives the ignorant man just as much power of suffrage as the intelligent man, despite the apprehensions of the elite of all the ages, that the masses are too ignorant to understand the complexities of government. One may also thank God for the wisdom which resides in a hungry belly rather than a sophisticated mind. The hungry belly announces at least that there is something wrong in a society which allows insecurity and hunger; and the sophisticated mind does not always know this, so long as the belly which feeds it is filled. The ignorant man may be too ignorant to make a pair of shoes; but not so ignorant that he does not know if a pair of shoes pinches him. Democracy must depend upon the wisdom of the pinched toe and the empty belly.

This does not mean that we ought not to continue to strive for political and moral perspective in our education. We will always need as much moral transcendence over interest and rational perspective upon conflicting passions as it is possible to secure. But to the end of time the college graduates will vote for the Deweys of their day. They will have known better in their youth but will have forgotten in the complacency of their middle age. They will organize "hate Roosevelt" clubs as they previously organized against Cleveland and Jackson. Therefore "blessed are the poor" not only in the kingdom of heaven, where their humility merits a special reward; but also in the kingdom of earthly justice where the partial wisdom of their unsatisfied needs is a resource of justice. Without it the nation would be victim of the illusions of the intelligent who are also powerful and privileged, whose eyes are too fat to see clearly and whose mind is too engaged by self-interest to think honestly.

* *

Political Wisdom in Advertising

The high taxation rates have driven more and more companies, who have no market except the government, but who would nevertheless like to spend money for advertising rather than pay it out in taxation, to preach their individualistic philosophy in their advertisements. They are not trying to sell anything; but are hoping to maintain their power by preaching a completely discredited and impossible *laissez faire* political philosophy. Thus "Warner and Swasey," a company which makes turret lathes, has taken full page ads in our various journals to declare, "Millions from every nation flocked to America because this was the one spot on earth where there was opportunity. Security need not be purchased at the cost of opportunity. If you and everyone whom you can influence will produce more efficiently you can reduce the cost of what you produce; the lower the cost the more people who can buy what you produce and the more secure your job."

One factor is neatly eliminated in this calculation. Modern technical process produces things more and more quickly. Some of this increased efficiency goes into lower costs but the costs do not drop as rapidly as the goods increase. The market is glutted with goods which people can not buy because they lack the income. Thus we face a production power of over $170 billion after the war; but once the government market

for war materials is lost we have a consuming power of only some $100 billion. That gap will not be bridged by lower prices. Instead of job security the workers of America face the peril of unemployment just as soon as the nation has used up its war-savings to satisfy its consumer needs. Are the big companies who are going in for social philosophy too stupid to know, or too dishonest to admit this?

* *

Dr. William Temple

Perhaps it is not too indelicate to mention, in mourning the passing of Dr. Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, that he was a friend and subcriber of this modest journal from its birth. He was a Christian socialist and shared most of the positions, taken theologically and politically by Christianity and Society. It was as a Christian radical in high position that he made his most outstanding contribution to the thought and life of the church and the community. Yet his work reached far beyond the field of social politics. As an ecumenical statesman, as a great theologian, and as a leader in his own communion, he was one of the most distinguished men of our time. His intellectual attainments surely exceeded those of any man, in either church or state, in our day. And if one may speak of such things, it is also true that his personal modesty and Christian charity and humility were a more gracious gift in his character than in any known public character. In mourning the loss of such a man one moves back and forth between a sense of public loss and of private grief.

One may count it unfortunate that Dr. Temple was not able to find an ecumenical formula which matched the breadth of his charity. He believed that the ministries of other churches were "owned of the Holy Spirit" but that they were nevertheless irregular and that nothing could be done about making them "regular" but bring them under the episcopacy. This would never have done in the long run as a formula of concord. It was in fact a proof of the greatness of his spirit that he could accomplish what he did as ecumenical statesman with no better formula as ecumenical theologian.

"LET BOTH GROW TOGETHER"

(St. Matthews 13:30)

Decision's edge can free the dead:
In halting hope and lame belief—
decide!

Decision only knows one side:
In bitterness, fear, and infinite doubt—
be led!

R. A. Landor

THE MEANING OF HISTORY

By CLIFFORD STANLEY

One of the characteristic concerns of our day is the question about the meaning of history. If we knew all the reasons for this concern we would know more about ourselves than any generation is ever permitted to know about itself. Though we do not know all of the reasons we know some of them. For one thing there is our wide grasp of historical facts themselves, our survey as from a tower, of the panorama of history. Thus it is commonplace to say of so-and-so that it is the first or greatest or best of all history. Second, the old realistic view of eternity as a world beyond the world has faded and has been replaced by a concentration upon the life of this world. Thus it becomes a necessity of thought to ask what this our life means. Because of these and other reasons, man has for some decades, been playing Providence and assigning meaning to history, evolutionary and otherwise. Just now man is less confident, and the question about the meaning of history is asked, not with easy optimism but with urgent overtones of despair. Our topic, the meaning of history, is consequently a leading question for this time.

It seems desirable to begin by distinguishing between history and the meaning of history. Once we have done this, we can go on to say that almost everyone has history; history is almost a universal mark of mankind. In fact, I am almost prepared to make the possession of historic life one of the essential qualifications of humanity. But to say that everyone has history does not say that everyone understands equally the meaning of history. Some men have ideas which cast little light upon their own historic life; other men have ideas which cast aspersions on it. If we begin by admitting that all men have history, we are less likely to encounter opposition, if we go on to say that some men understand the meaning of history better than others.

When we come to the word "history" itself we are struck by the fact that it has a double meaning. On the one hand it refers to the historical events themselves. On the other hand, it refers to the record of those events. The first use of the word occurs in such a sentence as the following: Rome had a long and illustrious history. The second use is illustrated by such a sentence as this: Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic* is a brilliant history.

We might say a brief word about history as event, the first of the two meanings of the word. For the purposes of this paper, history is the life of a group which is united by sharing a common meaning. Historical groups are united by meanings; they are not simply biological groupings like ant colonies. Furthermore historic life is group life. Emil Ludwig wrote a book called, *Gœthe, the History of a Man.* We know what he means and the word may be thus used in a figurative sense but I do not regard Ludwig's employment of the word "history" as a scientific use. The historical group may of course be anything in size from two or three people to all humanity. I, myself, regard the nation as the characteristic historical group. With this in mind, we may say

that history is the whole life of the historical group and particularly those acts which reveal its quality in a marked way or which contribute decisively to its continuance.

But the record of historic events is also described by the word "history." What this means is that men are keenly conscious of historical events. They are conscious of them as significant for the life of the group. For this reason the events must be recorded. The impulse which causes historical events to be recorded is not antiquarian. It is interested in the past for the sake of the future. Only so long as these events are remembered, will men understand their own historical existence and know how to act harmoniously with the nature of the group. These records may be passed orally from generation to generation or they may be written. They range from the half-historic, half-legendary epics such as the Homeric poems or the Arthurian tales through the simple chronicle, such as that of the venerable Bede to the kind of accumulation that goes on in the Archives Building in Washington. But in all this the essential element is present: the significant deeds are explicitly and conciously remembered.

We may make a further distinction between history, in the sense of record, and historiography. Historiography is the scientific study and evaluation of historical narratives. Historiography is secondary, but history is primary. The work of Herodotus is a notable example of historiography. It represents a first essay in the science of history or historiography. The line between historical narratives and historiography is not always clear, but there is no question of the difference between a record made by a member of a group as a life and death matter and the calm, detached study of events from a scientific point of view.

We have now said something about the character of historical life and made the statement that most life is of this quality. In Israel, however, something was added to the fact of the historical life itself, namely, a sense of its meaning. The course of history, the doings of the nation and of all nations, the acts of men and groups—all these were invested with absolute meaning. Once this achievement is actualized by Israel, it becomes necessary to apply it to all men and ask, what meaning do they find in historical life? An examination of the facts reveals that the majority of men have very little idea of the meaning of history. In some cases there is an idea but it is a negative one, casting discredit upon historical life.

By now we have distinguished between history and its meaning. We turn at once to the question of history's meaning, which is our chosen topic. In doing so, we must confine ourselves to the tradition in which we stand the streams of tradition which flow into it.

We may well begin our examination into history's meaning by turning to the Greek development. At once we are struck by the fact that the Greek witness was complicated and not simple. Greek philosophy, for example, said little about the meaning of history and its general witness was negative. Windelband, in his great *History of Philosophy*, goes to the root of the matter. (p. 255.) He says that the basic question of Greek philosophy was for the abiding essence of things. Consequently "the chronological course of events had always been treated as something of secondary importance, having no metaphysical interest of its own." While the witness of Plato is inconsistent, he tended on the

whole to concentrate on the eternal realm of Ideas and to disparage the individual, non-necessiated aspects of existence. Neo-platonism, after him, condemned the life of this world and spoke of the body as a tomb. The Stoics had the nearest thing to a reasoned philosophy of history possessed by the Greeks. They regarded the course of the world as a series of cycles, in which all was determined and in which everything recurred countless times. Aristotle had a not dissimilar idea. Taking all this evidence together, we may agree with Windelband that, "the inquiry for a meaning in human history taken as a whole, for a connected plan of historical development had never once been put forward," by Greek philosophy.

In his *Nature and Destiny of Man,* (vol. I, p 10) Niebuhr comes to the same conclusion: "Neither Greek nor Roman classicist had any conception of a meaning in human history." But after saying this, Niebuhr turns to another production of the Greek spirit whose witness is not quite the same. I refer to Greek tragedy. According to the tragic outlook, history had an ultimate meaning. The deeds of men were subjected to a continuous divine scrutiny and received a merited award. According to the tragedians, all human creativity was marred by destructiveness and pride, (arrogance). The greater the amount of creativity, the more marked the pride. Because of the disorder men wrought and because they trenched arrogantly upon the divine realm, they were destroyed by Zeus. This was the meaning of history, then, man's opposition to the divine and the divine punishment of man. Before we leave the tragedians let us make several observations. First, the guilt, of which they spoke, while residing in the spirit of man, is yet not the full guilt of a free spirit. It is more nearly an objective guilt, the mark of a spirit only partly awakened. Second, the tragedians never offer a solution of the tragic conflicts of which they spoke, the conflicts between man and God, between man and man and indeed between the gods themselves. They simply state the facts. Niebuhr says truly of Greek tragedy, "It has no answer for the problem it presents." (p. 10.)

We now turn to the meaning of history as discussed by Israel. But first we have to show that Israel set forth a universal history, one history participated in by all mankind. It is necessary to do this in order to show that when Israel spoke of the meaning of history, it was referring not only to the meaning of Israel's history but to the meaning of all human history, of history as such.

Some time ago in another connection I had occasion to sketch out the elements of universal history as envisioned by Israel. Let me reproduce them here briefly. First, God rules over all nations. Second, He judges them all and calls them to account for their transgressions. Third, God uses all the nations to execute his judgments and does so whether they acknowledge His name or not. Fourth, all nations participated, along with Israel, in the religious hope. This hope included, first, a unity, God and His worship and, second, a unity of mankind. This evidence shows that whatever conclusions were reached by the Hebrews about the meaning of history were conclusions about human history as such.

The first ingredient in the meaning of history is creation. God made man—body and soul, male and female, individuals, families and nations. Since all these things come from Him, they all derive ultimate worth from their

eternal origin. Since they all come from Him, each one of them has a part in the life of ultimate meaning. The ultimate meaning of history, of individuality, of the concrete, derives finally from the unity of all things in creation.

Because God made all things, His nature and His intent determine their constitution and their normal activity. Thus the Law as an explicit thing of principles and ordinances roots in the fact of creation.

The second element in the meaning of history is the fall. There is evil in the world; a holy God did not create it; therefore its origin takes place after creation and is a perversion of it. Even if there were only one evil act in the world, some such theory as the fall would be required to account for it. But the fall points to more than a single evil act. The act gives rise to a status. This is symbolized by the angel with the sword of flame which prevented Adam and Eve from returning to the garden. (Gen. 3:24.) The teaching is clear that the world is fallen.

The idea of the fall must be regarded as the theoretical counterpart of the experience of Israel and particularly of the prophets. It is clear that the great message of the prophets is one of judgment. Some years ago I used to hear the prophetic work referred to as "the prophetic criticism." This seemed a rather negative description of the prophetic work and I set out to disprove it. I looked for all passages where the prophets exhorted men to do something or where they assumed that there was a chance to do better. There proved to be very few. Then I subjected this "remnant" to the critics and found that only a handful remained. If we turn to the crown of the prophets, Isaiah and Jeremiah, this reading is confirmed. It is generally acknowledged that the great story of the call of Isaiah was written after the ministry had well begun and its grim outcome was apparent. "Whom shall I send?" asks God. "Send me," said Isaiah. And he said, "Go and tell this people. Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and turn and be healed. Then said I, Lord, how long? And he answered, Until the cities be wasted, without inhabitant, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate." (Is. 6:8-11.) The same grim note recurs in the call of Jeremiah. God says, "I have made thee...a defenced city, an iron pillar and brazen walls against the whole land...and they shall fight against thee." (Jer. 1:18-19.) Later on Jeremiah comes to a sad conclusion about man, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." (Jer. 13:23.) These passages may be disputed, but the really conclusive evidence is the new covenant. (31:31-34.) The new covenant is required because of the breakdown of the old. And the old one was broken because men could not obey God's law.

This brings us to the center of gravity of the Hebrew theory of the meaning of history: human history is the concrete outworking of the fall; it is the embodiment of human pride and disobedience. For this reason, human history is also a manifestation of God's judgments upon human sin. History is a divine-human encounter in which man defies God and God punishes man.

This version of history's meaning is reminiscent of the Greek-tragic view of

history and indeed there are many points in common between the two views. But there are explicit differences as well. First, there is a difference between the full dimension of sin as understood by the Hebrew and the semi-unconscious, partly natural, objective guilt of Greek tragedy. Second, the Hebrew did not sacrifice the unity of God to explain the conflicts of history, whereas the tragedians thought that the gods themselves were at odds because of the visible dissensions of history. Third, the Greek tragedians stated their problem and offered no solution for it, whereas the Hebrews offered the hope of a solution. Hope was the last element in the Hebrew idea of the meaning of history and to it we now turn.

The Hebrew always believed that judgment did not exhaust the divine purpose. After God had struck down the wrong, He Himself would bring salvation. The first expression of hope in salvation was the anticipation of a good ruler raised up by God. Thus the hope was in the first instance very concrete and immediate. But a greater part of the hope was invested in a supreme king, a son of David's line who was to come. This figure of expectation was political in character; he was an actual king, yet he was not just an ordinarily good king but a person apart. There were not a number of examples of this king. Rather there was but one. He came once and his coming inaugurated a new era. His work did not need to be repeated and the Hebrew had no resource beyond it. It is clear from this that we have here not an ordinary historical hope but a hope standing on the borderline of history. The next stratum of the hope, the real center of gravity of the hope in my opinion, was beyond history altogether. This last level of the hope pointed to a time when the hurt and warfare would be taken out of nature and from man. (Is. 11:1-10. Isaiah 2:2-4 belongs to this same level, in my judgment.) This clearly points to a miracle and drives us beyond this kind of historical actuality. I should hold that the same thing is true of Jeremiah's anticipated new covenant. (Jer. 31:31-34.) The same thing is true of Joel's envisioned age of the Spirit (Joel 2:28-29.) With these prophecies the religion of Israel reaches its climax reposing in hope rather than realization, thrusting beyond this world rather than remaining in it.

We are now ready for the Christian view of the meaning of history. The Christian teaching is not a variant of the Hebrew and yet it cannot be understood apart from that view. What these statements reflect is the conviction that the hope of Israel is realized in Christianity.

Christianity takes over from Israel the doctrine of creation and its consequences for history. It accepts also the idea of a fall, which spoils but does not annul creation. In all human life there is the beauty and vitality of creation. But the fallen will of man distorts this sufficiently to make life self-defeating in the end. This quality of life to be at once creative and destructive, Tillich defines by the term "demonic." This will enable us to see why he describes the meaning of history as "the overcoming of the kingdom of the demonic by the kingdom of God."

Christianity agrees with Israel that the problem of history is so serious that a solution can be found only by bringing this period of history to a close and reconstituting upon a new level. Israel hoped for such a wind-up of the present period; Christianity brings it to pass in the Cross. The Cross is precisely the termination of this period of history,

with its mixed, its demonic character. Those who participate in it can say with St. Paul, "God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me and I unto the world." (Gal. 6:14.)

The new level, beyond this period of history, upon which life is reconstituted is the resurrection. The resurrection is the acknowledgment of the Christian company that the life in them is not the old life. Nevertheless it is a real life. Christians are in the world in the manner of men who once lived in the world, then left it, then were given new life by God. That is a precise description of the Christian consciousness.

There is one further step to be added. Christians are citizens of two worlds. They participate in the Resurrection but they also live in this world. They live in this world as citizens of another world. In early Christian terms, they live in this present age by the power of the age to come. Consequently the concrete life of the Christian folk is not purely of the age to come nor is it simply of this age. It has characteristics of both. The 'age to come' provides the spirit, the principle of their life; this 'present age' provides the content, the actual problem. For this reason, the victory of Christianity is limited in this world and Christ hath not yet put all enemies under his feet. For this reason, there is an element of hope, the expectation of a further victory, in Christianity. Looking back on the religion of Israel, Christianity is a fulfillment of the hope of Israel. Looking at Christianity itself, while it has a strong element of fulfillment, it has also a definite ingredient of hope.

We are now prepared for a final statement of the meaning of history, as Christianity understands it. With the coming of Christ, with the advent of the Crucifixion and Resurrection, the demonic kingdom, the realm of self-defeating history is overcome. Consequently the coming of Christ splits history in two. Before his coming, history meant preparation; now that he is come, all history is to be regarded from the viewpoint of fulfillment. What is true of these periods as a whole is true of each historical event within each period. Before Christ, each event meant a preparation for the coming of Christ; after his advent, each event reproduces in microcosm the coming of Christ to all history.

Now that we have assembled a number of truths about the traditions from which we derive, the thing to do is to apply them.

First, it is a central assumption of modern thought that there is one history in which all mankind participate. To what extent may this be based on the foregoing principles?

To begin with, Greek philosophy had no sense of history and therefore of universal history. The historiographer, to be sure, did write of many nations but the only historical unity of these peoples was in the mind of the historiographer. Incidentally, much modern "universal history is really only historiography; it is a thinking together of disparate historical traditions which had no actual connection either as event or as chronicle.

There was an implicit universal history in Greek tragedy but in actual practice the tragedians generally confined themselves to Greek men. There was nothing in them to correspond to the Hebrew Prophet's interest in Moab and Edom, in Egypt and Assyria.

When we come to the Hebrew we have a true universal history in which all men

participate insofar as they were all ruled, judged and finally saved by one God. Meanwhile the nations were not united empirically. Furthermore, many of the nations whom God used did not acknowledge Him. Indeed some of them were hostile to Him. Only at the end of history, when hope had been realized, would mankind all be united in one visible, literal body. In Christianity, all men are united in one history insofar as the intent of Christ is concerned. He died for them all, and potentially there is "one new man (i.e. mankind) in Christ Jesus." Meanwhile, the missionary enterprise is the instrumentality for actually uniting all men in one Christian history.

In our day the whole world has been united for the first time. This is due to transportation, communication and commerce. In an important sense the world has one destiny. But we still have the task of uniting this world neighborhood into a world community. At the present time we do not have one world history in the full sense of the term, that is, a whole world united upon the basis of a common idea. Certainly we do not have one meaning for the world's history, in the sense of the Hebrew or the Christian theory of history's meaning. Unless some of these deficiencies are supplied, the very intimacy of the world's union will be the basis for an explosion which will divide the world as oceans and mountain chains cannot divide it. On the other hand, the physical contiguity provides an opportunity for a unitary history impossible hitherto.

A second assumption of modern thought is to the effect that man has within himself the character and the power to achieve the ideal in history. Again we must ask what light our historical survey casts upon this assumption.

Greek philosophy, though it nowhere manifests the dreadful self-questionings of the Hebrew or the Christian, nevertheless has no great optimism about human virtue. This is true of Aristotle, Plato and even of the Stoics. Niebuhr puts it succinctly in the words, "The philosophers were optimistic in their confidence that the wise men would be virtuous; but alas, they had no confidence that the many could be wise." (*Nature and Destiny of Man.* Vol. I, p. 9.) Greek tragedy was of course frankly pessimistic: the greater the achievement, the greater the pride and hence the greater the punishment.

The Hebrew had some hope in connection with specific kings and limited objectives. But the widest verdict of the Hebrew upon history was expressed in the ideas of the fall and of judgment. With increasing certainty the men of Israel saw that man was a sinner and that his hope lay beyond history after some miraculous transformation had occurred. Christianity followed after, claiming to effectuate this miraculous transformation. Christians thought that they were a new mankind and certainly felt that a new moral potentiality stirred in them. Yet even their achievement was limited by the conditions of their life and their hope for man in this present world was rather modest. Taking our stand on this, we may say that Christians can reach a level of achievement open to no other man. This is most encouraging, as we contemplate the possibilities of history. It should inspire our missionary effort, both to convert new groups and new areas of life. Such a Christianized mankind, should it ever come to exist, would produce a justice not previously seen. But—traditional Christianity holds that even Christians cannot produce Utopia. The best that

can be done is still short, far short, of dreams and conscience.

We have time to examine one further assumption in the light of our accumulated principles. Modern man considers that history is meaningful in an immediate, simple sense, that the events of history are inherently significant. Since every event is significant, meaning must be added and pyramided, so that later events are more meaningful than earlier. What can we say of this?

Again we go back to Greek Philosophy and take our start. While Greek philosophy is not fully consistent, it never affirms a meaning of history in any clear and unmistakable manner. It is significant that such works as Zeller's *Greek Philosophy*, or Taylor's *Plato* do not mention "philosophy of history" in their index. Greek tragedy does affirm a meaning of man's historical life but it is dark and negative meaning. By his history, man does not actualize and consolidate meaning in this world. Rather, human life shows a recurrent destructiveness which is explained by the secret realities of human pride and divine wrath.

For the Hebrew, history was meaningful but it was a sinful meaning. It was the lengthening tale of man's rebellion and God's judgments. Man could not repose in the inherent meaningfulness of events. Rather he placed his confidence in God's judgments and faithfulness. Also he appealed from the disappointing present to the anticipated future. Here again, the confidence was not primarily in the better events to be, but in God, who would bring them about and then, secondarily, in the happier events themselves, i.e. the Messianic feast, etc.

This brings us to the light cast on one question by Christianity. The Christian life is a complex thing: partly it is a matter of the resurrection, partly it is of this world. Hence it is beyond history, in the usual acceptation of the term. I make this clear as a prelude to a statement about Christianity's attitude toward events. Christianity, unlike our previous authorities, does repose in the inherent significance of the events to which it gives rise. Speaking of faith, hope and charity, St. Paul says they "abide." They last. In them we have struck the high road of the universe. But note that this confidence is in ecstatic, heavenly things, things in this world but not of it. Also recall Christianity's own hope beyond the disappointing character of human history.

If we take note of our evidence, we find that in one place alone is there repose in the inherent meaningfulness of events and that is in Christianity. And the events in which Christianity reposes are separated by a chasm from all other human history.

In attempting to find the meaning of history I have appealed strongly to the traditions in which we stand. I did this not because I believe all the truths to have been discovered before our day, because I do not believe that. I believe that we have gained insights in our day that are both new and valid. But these new insights do not render obsolete the venerable truths of Israel and of Christianity, because they are ultimate insights and cannot be thus emptied. The modern truths qualify them and give them new applications. On the other hand, the ancient findings should have weight with us. With the new and the old in our possession and particularly with our present day interest in history, we should scale heights of vision upon the meaning of history such as no previous generation has enjoyed. With that opinion, reflecting as it does the modern spirit, I bring these remarks to a close.

ON SUFFERING AND TRAGEDY

By DAVID E. ROBERTS

The ambiguity of our attitude toward suffering, which I shall illustrate later, reflects the ambiguity of the human situation. By the ambiguity of the human situation I mean that man has affinities with both God and nature. He is endowed with reason, self-consciousness and freedom—that is, he is created in the image of God. But he is created; he is a creature. He is immersed in the natural processes of birth and decay, his body is an item in the nexus of natural causes; like the animals, he must eat, sleep, procreate, struggle for survival and die.

One might say that it is therefore inevitable that man should come to regard himself as Janus-faced. It is inevitable that he should find his life fraught with conflict and division. He is *Mensch im Widerspruch;* he is "Man Against Himself." And perhaps the underlying theme of all profound pessimism is to regard this human status as the *primal* evil. If man could become either one thing or the other, his dilemma would be solved. But to be caught in temporality, and at the same time possess a capacity for transcending time through memory and anticipation...to be immersed in the external world and yet possess the impenetrable freedom of an inner spiritual life...to be a particular, finite individual and yet possess the capacity for viewing everything through universal concepts...this is a bad joke, a tormenting riddle. It is as though some malicious Diety had deliberately set out to find a way of raising misery and discontent to their highest pitch, and after ages of experimentation had hit upon a marvellously successful answer to his quest in fashioning man.

Let us look at this inextricable connection between suffering and the specific characteristics of the human status. Berdyav says, in *The Destiny of Man*:[1] "Consciousness *is* pain, and loss of consciousness appears to us as the cessation of pain. Dostoevsky says that suffering is the only cause of consciousness. Consciousness involves a painful division." This is a way of saying that in order to become human we have to suffer. I think it was Unamundo who proposed a substitute for Descartes' formula: "I think, therefore I am." In its place he said: "I suffer, therefore I exist." And the whole point is that the two ideas are convertible. Even Alice in Wonderland saw the point when Tweedledum was trying to convince her that she was only a figure in the Red King's dream. "Well, it's no use *your* talking about waking him," said Tweedledum, "when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you're not real." "I *am* real," said Alice, and began to cry. And then she had an inspiration! "If I wasn't real," she said, "I shouldn't be able to cry."[2]

Of course, there is other suffering in the world—the suffering of animals; and we should neither exaggerate it sentimentally nor minimize it for the convenience of our theodicies. But obviously animals never have to face suffering in the peculiar dimensions of conscious selfhood. What makes human

1. P. 50.
2. Quoted by Stanley Hopper in *The Crisis of Faith.*

suffering qualitatively different from animal suffering is that man can ask whether his existence is worth the candle. The question never arises for animals as to whether their suffering is tolerable or intolerable, instrumental to some higher good or simply futile torture.

Consequently, so far as human suffering is concerned, we must recognize that all distinctions between the physical and the spiritual are merely relative. There are some writers, like C. E. M. Joad, who claim that all attempts to regard physical suffering as belonging to a sphere of secondary importance, are hypocritical. There are others, like the late R. G. Collingwood, who believed that all physical suffering is good for us, and that the only baffling evil in the world is the evil will. But the dispute arises only because both have dichotomized man. Actually, everything from minor toothaches to the most "spiritual" forms of anxiety and guilt take place within the context of a single personal life. This means that human suffering, in all its forms, can never be looked upon as a mere happening; for the *way* in which any suffering enters into the context of a person's life depends upon the meaning which he finds in it or fails to find in it.

Because men have recognized that their unique endowments add a unique dimension to suffering, many of the ways they have devised for meeting the problem can be summarily described as attempts to get away altogether from the human status. This attitude is familiar to us in Hinduism, Buddhism and Schopenhauer, where individual selfhood is a fundamental evil, and the path of release lies in the direction of pantheistic absorption or blank annihilation. The underlying formula is that non-existence is better than existence, so far as the individual is concerned. And what strikes most of us as strange about it is that the instant one uses the term "better," he is caught in contradiction, since the only criteria of good and bad we possess are arrived at in the midst of this created, individual life, and reflect the needs and longings of the very self which is ostensibly being renounced.

What is not so generally recognized, however, is the extent to which a great many optimistic and positive attitudes also posit emancipation from the human status as the only adequate resolution of the problem. Under this heading we must place the Platonic doctrine of immortality, where man's rational soul is envisaged as completely freed from the encumbrances of the body and temporality. We must also include all the optimistic varieties of pantheism, romanticism and mysticism which seek blessedness through a sloughing off of the limitations of finitude and individuality. The great merit of the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection is that it conceives of man's salvation in terms which retain the concreteness of our individual, historical existence. Against both the pessimistic and the optimistic attempts to get away from the finite self, Christianity conceives of the end of history in terms of a *fellowship* wherein the distinctness of men from God is retained.

We need to be duly skeptical, therefore, of all schemes which seek a way of "accepting the universe" only at the cost of escaping from the human status. Man's ingenuity in such matters is great, and sometimes it is difficult to detect the flow. For example, the Stoic's attitude of high-minded resignation seems, at first glance, to have much wisdom and health in it. When we cannot alter circumstances, both good sense and nobility would seem to counsel an uncom-

plaining adjustment to them. But "adjustment" is a weasel-word, and if a whole culture is sick, the lonely soul who defies it may be a last out-post of sanity. Conflict can arise as a result of stupid wilfulness; but it can also arise as a result of unyielding integrity. Hence we do well to remember that Stoicism served a dying age, and that its blanket acceptance of existence was never reconciled with ethical discrimination. Moreover, it is significant that the Stoics retained their harmonious world-view only by anæsthetizing feelings. Their feelings would have cried out in protest, and called their "reasons" liars.

A similar nemesis overtakes all attempts to reach the Good by passing beyond the concrete goods and evils of our human standpoint. Attempts to affirm an ideal world as real and to dismiss everything else as illusory are subject to a familiar dilemma; for if the so-called evils of existence are illusory, then there remains the *ineradicable* evil that we suffer from such illusions. Even the history of Christian theology has been darkened by misguided attempts to safeguard the righteousness of God by making our human estimates of worth irrelevant. There is a sense, of course, in which our human judgments are always defective and partial. But there is another sense in which, unless the things we call bad are also evil in God's sight, then we feel it more tolerable to contend with a blind Fate than to be asked to worship such a God.

These alternatives of acceptance and defiance are curiously blended in the literature of tragedy. Sometimes we hardly know whether to regard an indictment of circumstance as an instance of Titanic pride, or as an instance of compassion and a plea for justice. Take Prometheus as a case in point. Or take Job's complaint that, the moment he defends his own righteousness, he is put "in the wrong" because no one has a right to talk back to God. Often, even in the most outrageous complaints against the Diety there is an undertone of deep sympathy for the human race and rage over the misery and wickedness in which our lot is cast. All hatred for God and man has in it a mixture of pride and pathos, because of an unquenchable longing for a better fate. And we feel instinctively that if the longing ever died, if the protest ever ceased, then the fire of man's spirit would have turned to dust. There are noble forms of resignation; but there are noble forms of revolt, too. And it is often hard to distinguish the meekness of final beatitude from the craven submissiveness of someone who lacks the imagination and the courage to struggle any longer.

But we must ask the defiant ones, as well as the resigned ones, whether they are willing to relinquish the goods which attend our human status and which are therefore inextricably linked to its sufferings. As we have seen already, self-consciousness involves separation from nature and from other selves. By virtue of it, all of us are condemned to loneliness and impenetrability at the core of subjectivity. Kierkegaard spoke for all men, and not merely for himself, when he talked about his "heterogeneity." We are all "strangers here," as the hymn says. And all of us, like the hero in Marquand's novel, *So Little Time*, find ourselves amidst circumstances where we rub our eyes and ask: "How the hell did I get here?" Yet self-consciousness is the source of the uniqueness of the person, the endless variety of individual accomplishment; it is the precondition

of freedom and responsibility. It is what makes each of us an "indispensable man." For each is at least indispensable to himself, and that means indispensable to the universe in the only form that we can ever encounter it.

Or take conscience. There are times when we feel tempted to join Walt Whitman in saying:

> I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contained;
> I stand and look at them long and long.
> They do not sweat and whine about their condition;
> They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins;
> They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God...

In fact, man is so plagued by the internal conflict which underlies his ethical status that the whole history of the race could be written in terms of our effort to go back to a condition prior to conscience, or to surge forward to a condition beyond good and evil. The story in Genesis incorporates a profound truth when it tells us that something irrevocable happened when Adam and Eve ate fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. We know that there is something wrong with all of us insofar as we moralize, break rules and keep rules, feel guilt and try to remove the feeling. Yet we often fail to realize that the plagues of conscience are inextricable from its blessings. It is not only futile to try to stop viewing things in terms of value; even the desire to do so is contradictory, for any dream of a "better" life must be in *terms* of good-and-evil.

Thus we could go on listing other characteristics of our human situation, and asking at every point: "Could we have the weals without the woes?" This applies to our transitoriness, our imprisonment in time, which has always been a chief theme of poetic sadness. Yet without the one-directional prodding of time's arrow we would be suspended in unimaginable boredom. It applies also to man's maddening metaphysical hunger—his inability to refrain from asking ultimate questions for which he can find no answers. It applies also to all culture which can be developed and maintained only through a sort of shackling of our powers...like Promethus upon the rock. Rousseau was right when he said that man is born free, and is everywhere in chains. But what he forgot is that some chains are necessary if we are to make the transition from being brutes to being bourgeois. Perhaps it is nasty to have to choose one or the other, and it is with deep regret that we see civilization make its stodgy inroads on little children. But our discontents are quickly forgotten whenever we are hungry or need the help of a policeman.

Let us grant then that in learning how to be a man, one must accept the inconveniences of selfhood, conscience, mortality and culture, as well as their blessings. That is to say that we must not ask for the moon; we must learn that our selfish demands cannot be imposed upon the universe with impugnity. And giving up life as a bad job may sometimes be just a petulant way of refusing to fulfill the conditions which are the price of all high accomplishment.

But how far does that carry us? It means that we accept those cosmic structures which undergird our attainment of the human status. It means further that we can understand those sufferings which result from the employment of

our freedom; these are not imposed upon us by cosmic structure so much as they are brought upon us by ourselves. Yes, we can understand these two factors, although we may not be happy about them. And often it is impossible to draw a hard and fast distinction between these two—the "given" and the "self-caused." For within man himself it is hard to say how much an action is voluntary, how much involuntary. And on the bloody stage of history it is hard to say how much an event is due to intention and how much it is fateful. Only omniscience could foresee, and thus take responsibility for, all the consequences of our actions.

Both these inevitable and these self-caused sufferings can be "tragic," but they do not exhaust our accounting, and they do not constitute irresolvable tragedy because both of them can be linked interpretatively to significant patterns. Tragedy reaches its ultimate depths, however — becoming "stark" tragedy—in connection with a third type of suffering, which is not reducible to the other two. It is this third type, this "meaningless" suffering, which sometimes prompts men to curse fate and to defy God in ways that cannot be dismissed as childish and irresponsible.

Is this third classification a mistake? Are there no such sufferings? Philosophical and theological systematizing always tends to find some scheme whereby this third type is resolvable into the other two. The reason why we often prefer the poets and dramatists is that, whether our feelings enlighten or deceive us, at least feelings tell us that there is such a thing as unintelligible, meaningless, empty suffering. Kierkegaard's opening words in *Either/Or* are instructive in this regard:

> What is a poet? A Poet is an unhappy being whose heart is torn by secret sufferings, but whose lips are so strangely formed that when the sighs and the cries escape them, they sound like beautiful music. His fate is like that of the unfortunate victims whom the tyrant Phalaris imprisoned in a brazen bull, and slowly tortured over a steady fire; their cries could not reach the tyrant's ears so as to strike terror into his heart; when they reached his ears they sounded like sweet music. And men crowd about the poet and say to him: "Sing for us soon again"; that is as much as to say: "May new sufferings torment your soul, but may your lips be formed as before; for the cries would only frighten us, but the music is delicious." And the critics come, too, and say: "Quite correct, and so it ought to be, according to the rules of æsthetics." Now it is understood that a critic resembles a poet to a hair; he only lacks the suffering in his heart, and the music upon his lips. Lo, therefore I would rather be a swineherd.. and be understood by the swine, than be a poet and be misunderstood by men.

Kierkegaard's bitter words should warn us, as critics, against passing judgment prematurely upon disenchantment. People usually meet life "as best they can." And to say that an attitude which incorporated more faith, or more serenity, or more perspective, or more fortitude would be adequate to the situation may disregard entirely the limitatons and capacities of the individual involved. It does no good to tell a man that he would not be in despair if he had more faith, when his inability to have faith is precisely what makes his despair so poignant. It is like telling him that if he were stronger, he would be

stronger. That is true; but it is also futile. In order to find any "solution," we must first meet the person as he is and accept his feelings as they are; we must let the worst come out into the open. For if men's souls are ever healed, it is because of redeeming forces which encounter and transform our hopelessness and defiance; the healing never comes through forcing a pseudo-solution upon the mind.

The clue to the power of tragedy, as a dramatic form, is that it provides a sort of a solution of the insoluble by bringing misery, bafflement, defiance and pity out into the open. Thus it brings meaningless fate within the compass of man's creative spirit by *depicting* its workings. Fate disclosed and recognized, fate called by its right name and ranged against us, is somehow robbed of its worst power by being brought within the circumference of human recognition.

Further than this, paganism cannot carry us. Christianity attempts to take one last step, however, in declaring that there is a significant difference between a constructive and an embittered attitude toward even this third type of suffering. This difference marks the inmost citadel of human freedom. For without pretending to "understand" stark tragedy, man can make something meaningful which comes to him as meaningless. Yet this citadel of freedom is at the same time a sphere of mysterious "predestination." For why should some people have the capacity to tap the sources of spiritual triumph, while others are shattered under the bludgeonings of like circumstances? If even the bitterest moments can be made the occasion for a deepening of discernment and compassion, why are not all men able to avail themselves of this serenity in the midst of heart-break?

This threat of meaninglessness, confronting us at the intersecting point of freedom and predestination, shows that even a Christian attitude reflects the ambiguity of our human nature. It is certainly true that part of the grandeur and misery of man is that he must make life meaningful through creative spiritual acts; security and beatitude are not handed to him on a silver platter. But as we think of the frustration and defeat which attend so much human life—especially as we think in concrete, individual terms, instead of abstract ones—do we not find it difficult to reconcile this kind of "testing" with faith in God? There is something very callous about the Deity in the prologue of the Book of Job, when he consents to all of Job's misfortunes for the sake of trying his mettle.

Viewed from the angle of this power to transmute meaningless suffering, *all* evil is interpretable in terms of how we dispose of our freedom—freedom not so much of external acts as of spiritual disposition. But viewed from another angle, the role of human responsibility cannot be all-inclusive, since man is not self-created. Nothing occurs purely as a result of his spiritual activity, and how he meets the tests of life is never dependent merely upon his own resources. He is at every moment dependent upon the adequacy or inadequacy of resources which lie beyond his control. Hence although spiritual triumph in the presence of stark tragedy has an integrity which nothing can destroy, there always remains the further question as to whether this human meaning is like an oasis in a desert, or has some linkage with the nature of God.

GRACE AND POWER

By PAUL LEHMANN

Now that a measure of calm broods over the Christian mind with respect to the duty of Christians toward the war, it may be desirable and fruitful to view the unhappy controversy under another aspect. In such a case, Christians, in appraising their duty toward the peace, could be spared the temptation to estimate the course of events as the vindication of a previously held position. If there is "one Lord, one faith, one baptism," there is one gospel by which Christian thought and action are to be determined in peace as well as in war.

The bitter division among Christians with respect to the war focussed upon the issue of the non-violence of love as against the violence of conflict. There was, accordingly, a simple decision determined by the gospel. The way of love was the Christian way; the way of violence was opposed to it. In as far as a middle ground was conceivable, it was derived from the concern for justice which could be strongly supported both by the prophetic-biblical tradition and the history of natural morality. Since the persistent and complex manifestations of violence could not really be ignored, and since theological liberalism had accented the antithesis between love and justice in the nature and the will of God, the discussion took the more complex and also more relevant form of an issue between love and justice as norms of Christian duty. On this basis it was possible to regard love as a higher justice precisely because it sought to avoid the peril of aggravating injustice in every act of violence. On the other hand, it was possible to regard justice as the indispensable precondition of love in a world in which even covert action was imperilled by violence.

In the providence of God and the confusion of men, historical events have a way of becoming sufficiently complicated so that a given chain of consequences are not demonstrably traceable to a previous course of action. The United Nations stand on the threshold of victory. Such a victory would, of course, not have come in sight had the simple identity between Christian love and non-violence been determinative of international foreign policy. But such a victory cannot be regarded as a simple triumph of Christian justice any more than the persistence of injustices in the post-war world can be said to follow from the failure to take the way of love as an alternative to the way of conflict in human relations. Indeed, the impending peace settlement has placed the Christian mind before another issue which promises a salutary illumination of its previous confusion. Thus the complexity of historical events is a providential instrument not only for the chastening of human pride but for the instruction of believers.

The issue with which the forthcoming peace confronts the Christian mind is not between justice and love but between forgiveness and justice in a world in which conflict is inevitable. The Archbishop of Canterbury has put it in this way: "I shall probably be told that to advocate any penal action is contrary to the Christian principle of free forgiveness; but here two considerations must be borne in mind: first, Christian-

ity recognizes that forgiveness, to be real, must be costly. The Redeemer of the world took the cost upon Himself upon the cross. Some Christian saints have been able to come near to that manifestation of divine love. But, secondly, no nation has ever been Christian in a degree that makes that possible, and where it is not possible, infliction of a just penalty is nearer to Christian righteousness than such action as seems to condone the wrong."[1] Here forgiveness is substituted for love as the correlate of justice in defining the historical responsibility of Christians. It has the merit of eliminating the perfectionist implications of a simple love ethic because forgiveness is less easily generalized. It is called forth by specific wrongs in the face of which the offender and the pardoner can scarcely evade their common involvement. What distinguishes them from each other is not the wickedness of the offender and the rightness of the pardoner but their respective positions in a situation which has overtaken both. It is with the nature of this situation that this analysis is concerned. The main contention is that the proper understanding of the situation which calls for the application of both forgiveness and justice suggests two other terms by which Christian thought and action ought to be guided. These two terms are *grace and power*. Grace and power, rather than justice and love or forgiveness and justice, ought to determine the historical responsibility of Christians because these categories embody both what is central to the gospel and central to the relevance of the gospel in a world in which conflict and reconciliation are perennial historical responsibilities. I do not mean that love, justice, and forgiveness are not Christian categories. I mean only that they have to be understood with reference to the relations between grace and power if Christians are to be guided by the gospel in what they think and do in the world.

Dr. Temple is addressing himself to Christians in England in the hope that their own understanding of the position accruing to the nation as one among the victorious powers might be sufficiently relevant both to the gospel and to history as to influence national policies in the direction of Christian ends and expectations. "We have not got to consider what perfectly righteous England might achieve, but what is the best that sinful England may hope to do."[2]

Thus it is the position of the nation which determines the context of Christian thought and action. Now two things are important about this appeal for Christian decision. One is that it recognizes that the action called for is not based upon any excellence or other merit of the nation. It is not a matter of right but of responsibility; not a matter of capacity but of opportunity. This responsibility and this opportunity, moreover, are occasioned simply by the historical situation of the nation. They are to be accepted and not explained. Explanations could only adduce partial and superficial circumstances which led up to the situation and preoccupation with such explanations could only obscure the principal factor in the situation, namely, that the nation finds itself in a position which it did not deserve and could not predict. It has not been too long ago that a victory of the United Nations was very doubtful indeed. And it can scarcely be denied that resources rather more than will or skill have

1. Temple, William—The Hope of a New World —New York, 1942, p. 40.
2. Ibid, p. 45.

brought such a victory in sight. Thus, the position of a nation at any given historical moment is defined by an unpredictable and undeserved opportunity for action and by resources of action independent of the national will and the national skill. The second item of importance in Archbishop Temple's approach to the responsibilities of the peace is it Biblical orientation. In the Old Testament it is the nation, in the New Testament it is the community of believers in the Lordship of Jesus Christ which define the context of thought and action. It is true, of course, that Jesus singled out the individual as the special concern of God and as the bearer of special responsibilities toward God and toward his fellows. But this cannot be regarded as entirely foreign to late Judiaism nor as a warrant for an autonomous reading of what the Christian is to believe and to do. On the contrary, the Bible is of one mind when it comes to the fundamental character of the relations between God and man in the world. These relations are not defined by attributes or qualities which, because they are inherent in the nature of God or man or the world, can be universalized. They are not defined in individual terms, as though there were three distinct centers of meaning and activity which could be synthetically correlated. According to the Bible, in so far as God has any attributes, the world has any structure, and man has any particular duties to discharge, one fundamental condition is always presupposed. And the condition is this: both man and the world are what they are in view of the prior and the purposive activity of God. This means, on the one hand, that nothing ever *simply happens*, and on the other, that the true significance of what happens can never be discerned in a simple sequence of antecedent circumstances. It means further that there is no neutral standpoint with respect to which human action could be informed or initiated but all human decision is a response to a previous claim which both imposes a demand upon man's will and man's capacities and supplies resources for undertaking what is called for. In short, the Biblical identification of God the creator with the God of the covenant and of God the redeemer with God the creator means that there is a specific *given* which defines the relations between God and man in the world. In view of this *given*, the relations between God and man in the world are matters of position, not circumstances, capacities, qualities, and standards. It is this *given* which marks out what is central to the gospel and what is central to the relevance of the gospel in the world.

This Biblical *given* is compounded of grace and power. Grace and power are the fundamental elements of the situation in which Christians are called upon to act. And it is in terms of grace and power that the relations between justice and love and forgiveness and justice are to be understood.

According to the Bible, grace and power are the central aspects of the known activity of God. Indeed it is characteristic of Biblical, in contradistinction to mystical and primitive, religion to insist that what God *has made known* is more than enough to keep man busy and healthy without the diverting preoccupation with the unknown mystery of the divine nature and the divine will. We do not know everything there is to be known about God but we do know everything that God has made known and it is this knowledge which characterizes our position in the world. Now what we know about God is that He acts. God

makes a world which has no other excuse for being. God sustains that world by His providence and promise which continually outrun the bent of the world toward its own destruction. God redeems the world by taking its agony and frustration upon Himself in one act of atonement once for all. This is all a matter of record. But its bearing upon the course of the world and of man's life in the world is two-fold. Everything that happens in the world must be appraised with reference to the priority and the potency of the activity of God. The first suggests the nature of grace; the second, the nature of power.

Grace is the activity of God in its priority. That God created, sustains, and redeems the world is a matter of grace in the sense that there is no necessity for so doing and there are no conditions for so doing except those that occur in the doing itself. To say that God had to have a world or that there must have been a purpose for the world otherwise God would not have made it is to misunderstand the radical priority of the divine activity and in the last analysis to make God dependent upon the world as well as the world dependent upon God. To say that God has to sustain the world or to redeem it since He has made it, otherwise His activity would be arbitrary and capricious implies the same misunderstanding and the same error. The possibility of an arbitrary and capricious act of God may follow from His power but it does not follow from the priority of His activity. What does follow from the priority of the divine activity is that what happens in the world and what man does in the world is delivered from a stereotyped and sterile acknowledgment of insufficiency and incompleteness and set in a context of dynamic dependence upon the basic fact of existence. The basic fact of existence is that it can never be taken for granted but is an unpredictable and undeserved opportunity for being. Indeed, this is the way the radical priority of God is experienced, as an unpredictable and undeserved opportunity for being—and this is grace.

But if grace is decisive for our understanding of existence, it is also decisive for our understanding of God. This means that love and forgiveness, in so far as they characterize the divine nature and the divine will, cannot be interpreted after the pattern of human and worldly relations as such but only in so far as what happens in the world and what man does in the world is qualified by the radical priority of the divine activity, e.g., stands under grace. Thus the love of God is not God's all-inclusive benevolence but the will to be in relation with that which is not God, a relation under grace, that is, a relation which in view of the radical priority of the divine activity is not one of mutuality but of dependence and obedience. "Herein is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us. . .Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another."[3] Forgiveness is not God's inexhaustible patience with the world which is not as He made it, nor is it God's overlooking of what has gone wrong. But so long as we are men and not angels, in this world and not in some other, forgiveness, like love, is a matter of grace. Perhaps we could say that grace is the love of God expressed in the making and the sustaining of a world that is good; and grace is the forgiveness of God expressed in the sustaining and the renewing of a world that is evil. For grace, as we have said, is both the unpredictable and

3. 1 John 4:10-11.

the undeserved opportunity of being.

The second aspect of the divine activity, according to the Bible, is power. Power is the energy and the authority commensurate with the radical priority of the divine activity. Thus what happens in the world and what man does in the world is not helplessly dependent upon God but there are resources of strength and of direction which provide such dependence with purpose and with satisfaction. It is characteristic of the Biblical conception of power that the divine energy and authority are never arbitrary and capricious but always directed toward turning the dependence of man and the world to the well-being of both. The conjunction of grace and power in the activity of God means that there is no such thing as sheer omnipotence either in heaven or on earth. The omnipotence of God is the energy and the authority of God directed toward the fulfillment of a purpose which is given with every unpredictable and undeserved opportunity of being. The world that is established and sustained by grace is provided with an order and a dominion according to which dependence is not frustration but glory. When man who is to exercise dominion mistakes glory for frustration and crosses the border of life into death, he is not delivered up to slavery but to fresh possibilities of dependence which though tortuous and toilsome are nevertheless sheltered paths to the glory originally intended for him. So that of Cain, it is written, that he said unto Jehovah, "my punishment is more than I can bear... And Jehovah said unto him, Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold. And Jehovah appointed a sign for Cain, lest any finding him should smite him." And in long retrospect, it is declared of Abraham, that "he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God; and being fully persuaded that what he had promised he was able also to peform."[4] This kind of mercy and this kind of trust are possible in a world which exists in meaningful dependence upon the radical priority of the divine activity and in which that activity is also marked by self-authenticating energy.

In such a world, justice, like love and forgiveness, cannot be interpreted after the pattern of human and worldly relations as such but only in so far as what happens in the world is qualified by the self-authenticating energy of the divine activity. This means that justice is not the virtue of equity, and not the achievement of an equilibrium of power between contending energies striving toward authentication by sheer energy, and not the corrective discipline of a punishment commensurate with crime. These conditions may accompany any given decision for justice but they are not the heart of it because they do not express its true aim and motive. The Biblical conception of justice is derived from the Biblical conception of power and means an action which is directed toward and motivated by the known authority and energy of God. Unless, for instance, the victory of the United Nations is to go down in history as a triumph of sheer strength, e.g. of energy compounded of will and skill, and, neglectful of its true resources, without ulterior authentication—that victory will have to be viewed as an unpredictable and undeserved opportunity of being and as the fruit of resources beyond human desire and contrivance. In the former case, it would be a victory with-

4. Genesis 4:13, 15; Romans 4:20-21.

out justice; in the latter it will be a just triumph. For as grace is experienced as an unpredictable and undeserved opportunity for being, power is experienced as the possession and application of resources beyond human will and skill. On the other hand, there are perversions of power just as there are repudiations of grace. These occur whenever the energy and the authority by which life is lived in the world is centered in the desires and the capacities of men and when life in the world or any given order of things in the world is taken for granted. Thus the real peril of Naziism is not its threat to the global status quo but its repudiation of grace and its usurpation of power. It boasted that its existence was the inevitable and deserved destiny of a nation, indeed, of an historical epoch, and its authority was justified by its energy.

What Christians, then, have to think and do in the world is always defined by the fact that they *actually are* in a position of unpredictable and undeserved opportunity and of resources of authority and energy, beyond their will and skill, for conformity with the divine purpose in and for the world. They know that God has acted and they must act accordingly. In view of this activity, the gospel is necessarily relevant to what is immediately going on in the world and what is going on in the world is judged and redeemed by what is central in the gospel namely, the prior activity and authority of God in the expression and the execution of His purpose.

"Why do the nations rage,
And the peoples meditate a vain thing?
The kings of the earth set themselves,
And the rulers take counsel together,
Against Jehovah and against his anointed, saying,
Let us break their bonds asunder,
And cast away their cords from us.
He that sitteth in the heavens will laugh:
The Lord will have them in derision.
. . . . . .
I will tell of the decree:
Jehovah said unto me, Thou art my son;
This day have I begotten thee.
Ask of me and I will give thee the nations for thine inheritance,
And the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.
. . . . . .
Blessed are all they that take refuge in him.[5]

On these terms justice can never be the antithesis of love but is always the necessary consequence of love experienced as grace. For every unpredictable and undeserved opportunity of being requires the application of resources beyond human will and skill in resistance against usurpation of the power of God and in the re-assertion of that power. And contrary to the argument of the Archbishop of Canterbury,[6] justice is not the corrective condition for the operation of the freedom of forgiveness but the reconditioned establishment of an order of life in the world commensurate with the fact that the world is sustained by the Creator for the common life of all nations and peoples and that "the Redeemer of the world took the cost (of the misdeeds of all nations and peoples) upon Himself upon the Cross."[7] In view of this atonement, the counterpart of an unconditional surrender ought to be an unconditional peace, the settlement of which would not be imposed by victors upon vanquished but proposed

5. Psalm 2:1-3; 7, 8, 12c.
6. Ibid, pp. 37 ff.
7. Ibid, p. 40. Parenthesis mine.

by all for all in acknowledgment of common guilt and a common unpredictable and undeserved opportunity of being. This would really be free forgiveness in the freedom of the grace and power of the gospel. But "history is the record of man's entanglement in sin; and...that consummation lies beyond the historical process."[8] Meanwhile, those who are called upon to act by the grace and power of the gospel will not make the mistake of supposing that the "corrective justice" which they seek to apply is part of the condition which, when it "is fulfilled the forgiveness is freely given" and so "is nearer to Christian righteousness than such action as seems to condone the wrong."[9] They will not be intrigued by the "retributive, deterrent, and reformative"[10] prospects of such "corrective justice" but with something much less wishful and much less ambitious. They will recognize that whenever in history the grace of God has been repudiated and the power of God has been usurped, there are those who, by that same grace and power, are called to check such denial and to express the priority and the authority of the gospel. This *is* the justice required by, not preliminary to, the operation of forgiveness and it *is* the *rightness* of God which is the only *righteousness* there is. And the test of whether such justice is a new denial of the grace and power of the gospel or the acknowledgment of an unpredictable and undeserved opportunity of being and of resources beyond human will and skill will be the recognition that the claim to exercise such justice is rooted simply in the position in which those who make that claim find themselves in this historical moment. That position is now as always given by Him "that sitteth in the heavens," that gives "the nations for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession," and who "imputes for righteousness" to them that are "fully persuaded that what he had promised he was able also to perform."

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8. Ibid, p. 45.
9. Ibid, p. 44, p. 40.
10. Ibid, p. 37.

THE PROTESTANT PROBLEM AS SEEN FROM A LOCAL PARISH

By RALPH H. READ

To begin with we make no attempt to deny Protestant values which any believer in the Protestant movement will take for granted. One sometimes wishes that historical forces might have so shaped themselves as to have left us with one Catholic Church in the best sense of that word, but then one never quarrels with history for what is written is written. On the other hand there is a tragic side to Protestantism which it seems to me a fair minded person must admit.

John Wesley once wrote, "Christianity is essentially a social religion; to turn it into a solitary religion is indeed to destroy it." There has been centrifugal force within Protestantism which has tended to do this very thing, so that at times it would appear that there are Protestants but no Protestant Church, indeed it even seems to some that Protestantism has ceased to exist as a social movement of any import.

Protestant Anarchy

The anarchistic elements within the Protestant Church must be evident to every observer. The original concept of individual inspiration and light through the personal authority of scripture has been replaced by individual darkness or chaos through ignorance of scripture. Bible controversies are stale issues to the average Protestant because for the most part he fails to any longer study his Bible or care what interpretation men place upon the inspired word. Biblical illiteracy has reached a new high level in the American Parish while Bible classes when they exist have become glorified Rotarian societies with speakers on almost every imaginable subject but the Bible. If our grandfathers fought with one another over the meaning of great Bible utterances and formed themselves into separate groups because they cared so much for their particular version of interpretation, and our fathers were intent upon passing on these varied versions to posterity, the present generation neither fight or are much interested in any version. Hence they are raising up a secular culture which bids fair to wreak spiritual destruction on the social future.

We have carried over the Protestant habit of individual decision apart from external ecclesiastical authority, but where the individual once understood and acted upon the authority of the Bible he now acts upon his own whims or fancies with not even the scripture to guide. He is not corrupted by Papal edicts but rather by the distorted edicts of his own lawless mind and heart.

Protestant clergy must accept a large degree of blame for this condition. Perhaps the balance of the fault lies in our chaotic "laisse faire" industrial civilization which has encouraged individual initiative but not personal or group responsibility. Our clergy have asserted so many times from the pulpit that "you can be a good Christian without going to Church," by which they meant that high religion must center in the soul and exercise independence of spirit, but their listeners have interpreted their

words to mean that they do not need to go to Church or be in any way dependent upon the aid or development of any group. How many Protestants today attend Church because they realize that there are certain values which cannot be reaped without a certain kind of group loyalty, values which such a loyalty to the group can give and which are not possible apart from it? No, our typical Protestant attends his Church's worship, if he feels like it and will remain home with as thin a pretext. In each case he generally decides the issue on the basis of his own preference since he is a Protestant and his Protestantism at least knows no Church authority and does not do what personal feelings fail to dictate.

Our Protestant friend likewise prides himself on the fact that he does not do things out of a sense of duty. He has been told behaviour which is activated by a mere sense of duty lacks meaning and that he must therefore only do what he desires to do. This he conceives to be the highest form of moral conduct. Space does not permit a wide discussion of this particular form of mental perversion of older concepts of the motivation for personal conduct. Suffice to say that it almost completely overlooks the fact that if all human conduct were reduced to every man doing only what he felt like doing in a given moment, human life as we understand it would not be possible. Human progress has been purchased at the price of multitudes who were faithful to tasks for which they had no desire, and which they had to drive themselves to carry through. Few people love to suffer but many have been willing to suffer rather than compromise the right as they have seen it.

The same kind of Protestant individuality carries over into our giving. The Protestant supports his Church in about the same way in which he supports his club, save for the fact that he is apt to give his club the better part of the bargain. The lack of a powerful group loyalty expresses itself in a generosity which matches the diminished loyalty. In earlier days a great Protestant was asked to pay taxes on large royalties which his government thought he had laid by on his writings. His reported answer was that he had two silver spoons, one in Bristol and one in London and that he would buy no more as long as so many around him needed bread. Jesus admonished his followers to take no script or purse with them when they went out to preach and teach the gospel. Apparently they were to become sort of wandering mendicants who were willing to surrender all desire for material gain in order that their truth might be known to their world, for great wealth would be in danger of corrupting truth or refusing ultimately to care for it. Softness and abundance would be the beginning of indifference.

It is difficult to see how the Protestant will achieve a larger generosity until he is able to gain a larger sense of community and group loyalty. We are generous with what we feel to be an integral part of our lives. We will give to the Church a little of what we have left after all our other desires have been met, unless we feel an organic relationship to the Church as a necessary part of the meaning of existence. A truly authoritarian Protestantism, able to convey life's deepest meaning through a strong sense of community or Church solidarity and loyalty, would work wonders with our current standard of financial values. Until such a Church community is attained, what is will remain.

Our Protestant dilemma is that we cannot bring greater meaning into people's lives without the creation of such a sense of community, and what might be called the philosophical anarchism of Protestant thinking prevents the realization of such a Church community among Protestants. So that sooner or later men and women refuse to support, or support half-heartedly, what has but little meaning to them.

Protestant anarchy further reveals itself in our Protestant neglect of prayer. One ventures to suggest that Protestants stopped praying because they did not learn to pray together and to work together for the objects of their prayers. Personal prayer life immersed in the intent of merely saving its own soul for some imagined future, irrespective of what might happen within its contemporary society in a social way, was inevitably destined to lose its sense of reality and be discontinued. As George A. Buttrick expressed it in his book, *Prayer*, "For a man to argue, 'I do not go to Church: I pray alone,' is no wiser than if he should say, 'I have no use for symphonies: I believe only in solo music'." Our Protestant individualist who would pray alone or worship nature on his golf course ends up by ceasing either to pray or worship.

Christian pacifism offered as a political solution is also chiefly a mark of Protestant perversion. It is the final confusion and end result of the philosophical anarchy that has overtaken so much of our Protestant thinking. To pervert Protestant doctrines of freedom from external authority, and the rights of the individual conscience under God, and cause them to mean that there are no group values worth fighting for is to distort the original concepts and use them for selfish ends. To believe that the power to protest tyranny whether of a Church or state means that we need acknowledge no need for any power and its lawful exercise is to relegate all human life to a wilderness, for even a regenerate human nature would have a need for order and a government to order human affairs. Even were Christ to rule men's hearts there would be need for ruling their physical existence, for no other reason than to establish predictability and order. To be willing to give the world over to international lawlessness and criminality, however guilty we ourselves may be in helping to create such lawlessness, is not to be a true Protestant but a religious anarchist of the worst stripe. While Martin Luther may have been too ready to believe that the powers which be are ordained of God, at least he did not make the mistake of supposing Protestant doctrine required no power.

When one views this kind of Protestant illusion he almost looks with longing eyes in the direction of the Catholic Church, despite its superstitions (which may be no greater than our own) and despite its too ready willingness to insert property rights ahead of human rights. At least the Catholic does not live in a fool's paradise since he knows that he is a part of the world and must be a part of it.

Protestantism and Industrial Culture

It is questionable whether the Industrial civilization corrupted Protestantism or Protestantism the civilization. It might be superficial to claim that Protestantism had much to do with the direction which the industrial revolution took. But there is small doubt but that our mechanical civilization has had much to do with the corruption of Protestant thought. It can be assumed that the economic man who selfishly coveted

the right to do as he pleased with the machines he created also wished to read divine sanction into that right. He could not be free to exploit industry until he had exploited the interpretation of his religion in such a way as to give him that freedom. The high position of authority which Protestantism gave to individual conscience was construed to make it possible for that same conscience to exploit all the tools of life, not exclusive of human beings, under the guise of the fact that conscience was saying that it was for the "greatest good for the greatest number of people." The history of this religious rationalization is so well known that we need only mention it here. But we fail to fully realize the fact that Protestantism has not yet recovered from this corruption of its original doctrines.

The medieval religious and Catholic culture which gave life organic meaning and a sense of community, expressing its power in architecture, paintings, music and literature, was gradually replaced by Capitalistic forms which split the world into a thousand pieces, dehumanizing its culture so that it was no longer recognizable. Indeed there was not enough organic unity left within culture to warrant the name. What was left were a large number of warring competitive groups within society which gradually for Protestant and Catholic alike reduced life to mechanical or material terms, sapping from it its spiritual vitality. However the havoc wreaked upon Protestantism was greater because with the Protestants there was no organizational authority left to prevent a complete break-up of culture.

As Dwight MacDonald expresses it in his new magazine *Politics*, "There seems to be a Gresham's Law in cultural as well as currency circulation: bad stuff drives out the good, and the worst drives out the bad." Capitalism at its worst drove out the newly formed semblances of Protestant culture, exploiting them for its own purposes; the residue became a kind of grouping spiritual chaos wherein men and women fail to see their dependence upon one another. The result is that while there is a definite "saving remnant" which constitutes a kind of beginning for a true Protestant culture, on the whole there is little that deserves to be called a religious culture within the Protestant Church. The fact that a periodical called *The Protestant* can arise in America which even suggests by its name that it has the power to speak for Protestanism is proof of the absence of any unified Protestant religious culture. Many religious groups who really have something to say would like to see such a culture built up. But the hectic character of the clamor is a strong hint of its non-existence. And such a culture cannot be created until Protestantism is able to create a Church with some measure of authority, though such authority need not be regarded as infallible. In fact, it would lose something of its force, as has Catholic authority, if it came to look upon its authority as infallible.

Protestants must come to see that Church authority of the right character need not be incompatible with Protestant doctrine. There will be no vital Protestant culture until this authority is created. Even political cultures do not make the mistake of supposing that they can live in a vacuum without any authority at all.

If such authority is built up it will have to be built around a new body of Protestant thought and belief, which thought will seek to reveal old misconceptions for what they are, namely, the

more or less cheap mouthings of philosophical and theological libertines. But here again, beliefs which are not rooted in a profoundly spiritual interpretation of life and society are of little use. The liberalization of religious culture produced its secularization. Liberal religious culture produced its secularization. Liberal religion was not sufficiently grounded in a Christian understanding of human nature to produce anything better than secularism. To find a true Protestant culture then means that we shall rediscover the heights and depths of Christian experience and faith. Without this discovery a healthy Protestantism is not possible. Shallow religion is forever doomed to live in a shallow shell. How can it be otherwise?

The New Protestantism

If the Protestantism of the future is thus able to revive its life through finding a new conception of the Church, an organic conception of a spiritual society of dependent men and women, and therefore a new sense of community and loyalty to it, this discovery will revolutionize our approach to the problems of society. Then we shall no longer justify either total subservience to the state (this is also a denial of the sense of community), or the state's rightful place in human life. We shall realize that a culture through which each man exploits life to suit himself without thought for his neighbor, or a culture wherein one nation achieves monopoly and exploitation of resources which rightfully belong to all nations, deserve the bitter death and destruction which they produce. Either we shall substitute a sense of community with its spirit of brotherhood and humanity for a community of grabbing and dog eat dog or we shall witness the further ruin of our hopes and dreams for human life. Religion will learn to sanctify sharing in the place of greed, or life will be but fit for vultures and snakes in human guise.

The new Protestantism should recognize that such mutuality requires organization and group dedication. In such a culture we will care for one another. We will not suppose that organized evil can be met and conquered with an unorganized goodness. A modern Protestantism that preens itself as superior to a rival Caholicism cannot counter the growing influence of such Catholicism without the creation of its own effective organization and strategy. This does not mean that we will stoop to a Jesuistic Machiavellianism or build up a political theocracy with inordinate power. It does mean we will appreciate the truth that the kind of influences which organized groups wield cannot be countered by us save through the perfection of an organization with unity and religious purpose. This is ordinary common sense. If there are values which can come only through the group, the group must be prepared to strive as a group for those values. It is to be expected that it will keep its group striving on a level of fairness and common decency.

This will involve a revision of the current Protestant concept which seems to believe in a kind of disembodied Church espousing ideals and meanings in life but which is unwilling to create a potent organization for their extension. It would appear that the slogan, "Let the Church Be the Church" is a fictitious pigment of that imaginative supposition that righteousness can get ahead on wistful desire, or exist in a vacuum, apart from an organized body of determined men to foster it with reasoned devotion.

It cannot be denied that there are dangers which would beset such an or-

ganized Protestant Church. All great institutions, together with all forms of organized power, tend to corruption. When they lose sight of their reason for organization or their initial freshness they may slowly reach the stage when they are tempted to crush the human spirit or enslave it in legality. This is a risk that must be taken if our mission is to be fulfilled. It is obvious that we cannot go much farther, if we continue to merely enact the role of "protestors." There is a more creative role and era in Protestantism, if we have the vision to march into it.

There is an eternal principle in Protestantism which puts upon the individual a responsibility for his religious and spiritual development. But we are slowly coming to perceive that such a personal development is not possible in a solitary religion, for we are members of a human race whose highest realization is dependent upon our "togetherness" and mutual aid. Until we can begin to live for the group, the beloved society, or the Kingdom, as conceived in social and community terms, our religious expression is ingrown, leading as we have intimated to religious nihilism or social anarchy. To lose Protestant license in a new Church which will make real demands upon us will be to find our life again.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

David E. Roberts is Dean of Students of Union Theological Seminary.

Clifford Stanley is Rector of St. Peter's Episcopal Church, St. Louis, Missouri.

Paul Lehmann is Associate Professor of Biblical Literature in Wellesley College.

Ralph Read is Pastor of The Wyoming Community Church of Milburn, New Jersey.

Charles Kean is Rector of the Grace Episcopal Church of Kirkwood, Missouri.

W. Burnet Easton is Chaplain and Professor of Religion at Massachusetts State College.

Mrs. Abigail Acker McLaughlin is a Teacher of Social Studies at the Sleighton Farm School for Girls in Pennsylvania.

John R. Everett is a graduate student at Union Seminary and Columbia University and an Instructor in Columbia.

Eduard Heimann is Professor of Economics in the graduate faculty of New School of Social Research.

OUR CHAPLAINS

Many requests have come from members of the Fellowship asking for the addresses of our Chaplains in the Army and Navy. Here is a partial list of our Chaplains (members and subscribers) as we have them in our files, and we hope that the publication of it will prompt our members to write to them:

Chaplain Charles W. Arbuthnot, Jr., 0-491545
143rd Infantry, A. P. O. 36
c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

Chaplain Charles Austin
Chaplain School, U.S.A.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Chaplain Roger W. Barney
H&S, 23rd Marines
4th Marine Division, FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain W. A. Bicket
74th Station Hospital
A. P. O. 383, c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain Marvin D. Brown
Chaplain Section Hdqts., CBS
A. P. O. 667, c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain John B. Coburn, USNR
Naval Air Station
Hutchinson, Kansas

Chaplain John I. Daniel
Headquarters, Matagorda Island Bombing and Gunnery Range
Foster Field, Texas

Chaplain Richard W. Day, 0477185
Hq. Co., 47th Inf., A. P. O. 9
c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

Chaplain E. A. de Bordenave
Navy 157, Fleet Post Office
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain Fred Denbeaux, 0-514036
79th Ordinance Battalion
A. P. O. 403, c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain John Dillenberger, USNR
U. S. Fleet Hospital 111
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain (Capt.) Paschal D. Fowkes, 0.483005
Hq. 507th Parachute Inf. Regt.
A. P. O. 230, c/o Postmaster,
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain Sam Franklin, Jr.
25th U. S. Naval Const. Bn.
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain (1st Lt.) Edward G. Harris, 0553686
168th General Hospital
A. P. O. 5934, c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain A. J. Helm
Hq. 69th Ord. MM Bn.,
A. P. O. 502, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain William Jackson Jarman, Lt., U.S.N.R.
U.S.S. Whitney, c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Cal.

Chaplain Clarence Kilde
183rd Station Hospital
A. P. O. 942, c/o Postmaster
Seattle, Washington

Chaplain Gregory J. Lock
15th Tng. Regt.
Camp Robinson, Arkansas

Chaplain Cornelius R. Loew, USNR
Navy 140, NAB, Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain Hilton O. Morton
1621 "I" Street,
Sacramento, Calif.

Chaplain Henry B. Robbins
26th Division Artillery
Ft. Jackson, So. Carolina

Chaplain D. Evor Roberts
20th Special USN Const. Bn.
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain Francis B. Sayre, Jr.
U.S.S. San Francisco
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain LeRoy I. Setziol (1st Lt.)
0-518336
Hq. 1st Bn., 172nd Inf., A. P. O. 43
San Francisco, Calif.

Chaplain Arthur M. Sherman, Jr., USNR
97th N. C. Batt. Sect. 2
c/o Fleet Post Office,
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain (Capt.) Roger L. Shinn
0-1287602
Company C, 60th Armed Inf. Bn.
A. P. O. 259, c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Chaplain Paul L. Stagg
Hq. 1511 Qm. Trk., Regt. Avn.
A. P. O. 635, U. S. Army
c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

Chaplain W. R. Stevenson, USN
U.S.S. Botetour
Small Craft Training Center
Terminal Island, San Pedro, Calif.

Chaplain Charles Stinnette, Jr.
0530290
Hq. 10th Army, Ch. Sec.
A. P. O. 357, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.

IN THE DISORDER

Not they, perhaps, so much as we who stayed,
Will be the disillusioned in the peace:
They went to fight, uneasy and afraid,
While we sat down to our analyses.

Not they perhaps, who angered in the fight
Are to be shattered in a world at odds,
But we who talked of all man's need and right
May ask if we were worshipping the gods.

They who return expect to find the good
They battled for the same and better still.
We who have only watched have understood
A stranger justice than the one they will.

Not they perhaps, who went and feared and fought
And come to claim the order they believed,
But we who only stayed in fear, and thought,
May quake in the disorder we perceived.

ABIGAIL ACKER MCLAUGHLIN

BOOK REVIEWS

MEN AND SAINTS, by Charles Peguy, translated from the French by Anne and Julian Green (Pantheon, $2.75)

"Quite at bottom, we did not wish France to be constituted in a state of mortal sin." Thus Charles Peguy, the apostle of modern French Catholic humanist-mysticism, explained his defense of Major Dreyfus in the famous case which rocked France about forty years ago. This famous French essayist and poet who was almost completely unknown to the English-speaking world until Anne and Julian Green published *Basic Verities*, selections from his works, a year ago, has had an important influence upon French thinking since his death in the first Battle of the Marne in 1914.

Like the first volume, the second book is a collection of essays and poems which Peguy published between 1900 and 1914 in the little books he issued from his own press and which he entitled, *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*. They represent at its best a peculiarly French attitude toward life which is manifested in theology by Jacques Maritain, in polical essays by Georges Bernanos, and in secular essays by Antoine de St. Exupery. It can only be described as humanist-mysticism appreciated against the background of Roman Catholic culture, simple without being naive, pious without being sentimental, and yet profound in the nature of its human sympathies.

In this present volume, Anne and Julian Green have selected a number of essays and poems on a variety of subjects, with the only real common denominator being their exemplification of Peguy's conception of man—man, as saint and sinner, man in history and greater than history. These selections reveal a philosophy which is so peculiarly French that its distinctive idiom may confuse rather than enlighten if one does not take the trouble to appreciate profoundly Peguy's paradignatic treatment of man. The essay on Joan of Arc should perhaps be read first, as it reveals the basic symbolism. To Peguy, as to Bernanos and many other Frenchmen, Joan of Arc is the classic exemplification of the Frenchman's role in history a paradigm of France, as the experience of France is a paradigm of the totality of human history. She is presented as the flower of French peasantry, responsive to God and identified with man, and therefore usable historically as a creative force on behalf of freedom. And freedom is not merely political or economic freedom, both of which Peguy values, it is freedom against the background of eternity, the freedom of the human soul before God. This same understanding is presented in different form in Peguy's poem about St. Louis and the Sire de Joinville, in which God discusses the value of St. Louis.

The Dreyfus case, the most dramatic event in Peguy's life comes into this volume in three essays, and these again reveal Peguy's basic attitude. They also do something else. They present a point of view, focused on a specific historical problem, which outlasts in value the situation to which it was addressed. Peguy's understanding of the meaning of the case, perhaps expressed in different terms, has point for the present day. "In reality the true position of the peo-

ple who opposed us was, for a long time, not to say and to believe Dreyfus guilty, but to believe and to say that innocent or guilty the life and salvation of a people, the enormous salvation of a people, could not be troubled, could not be upset, could not be compromised, could not be risked for one man, for a single man. Tacitly, they meant: the temporal salvation. And precisely our Christian mysticism culminated so perfectly, so exactly with our French mysticism, with our patriotic mysticism in our Dreyfussist mysticism, that what must be clearly recognized is that our point of view focussed on nothing less than the eternal salvation of France. What indeed was it we said? Everything was against us, wisdom and law, I mean human wisdom, human law. What we did was in the order of folly or in the order of holiness, which are alike in so many ways, which have so many secret correspondences, in the eyes of human wisdom, underneath human scrutiny...Quite at bottom we were the men of eternal salvation and our opponents were the men of temporal salvation...In this world, in this modern world, in any world, it is the Christian doctrine alone which to this extent, so deliberately, so totally, so absolutely insists upon holding temporal death as nothing, as an insignificant matter, as a zero in comparison with the cost of eternal death, and the risk of temporal death as nothing in comparison with the cost of sin, or mortal death."

Another but related aspect of Peguys thought is given in the following selection from his poem, "Hope":

"Faith is she who watches during centuries and centuries.
Charity is she who watches during centuries and centuries.
But my little hope is she
who goes to bed every night
and gets up every morning
and really sleeps well.
I am, says God, the Lord of that virtue."

Anne and Julian Green have done a magnificent job of translation. The arrangement of the volume so that the French text is produced on pages facing the English text may add to the enjoyment of many readers. Julian Green's introduction to this volume seems to have taken the Roman Catholic content of Peguy's thinking in a sense not quite consonant with the man upon whose life and works he is commenting. The introduction would make Peguy more institutional a Catholic than seems warranted by the evidence, since Peguy's Catholicism is just as mystical (in his sense of the word) as his patriotism. This volume, however, is of great value making available for English readers the work of a simple, yet profound, French thinker of the first magnitude.

A Christian Socialist would not accept all of Peguy's premises, particularly his conception of the Catholic Church. We would also be concerned lest a too uncritical acceptance of his humanist-mysticism open the door for an escape from man's dialectical relationship to history by way of the abstraction, mankind. This reviewer does not believe Peguy himself evades the issue that way, but he does see a serious possibility that his thought forms will suggest that escape to others. The Christian Socialist should be concerned over an acceptance of the kind of mysticism of Peguy and others of the same general bent, because, while it is not mysticism in the technical sense but rather intuitive identification with whatever is its object—Christianity, the Church, or France—, it can easily dull the edge of the existential encounter. Again, while Peguy does not use our

terminology, his own works read in the setting of his life do not evade existence, but they can become the means whereby others can. The same criticism can be made of most writers of his particular school.

On the other hand, the value of Peguy for a Christian Socialist lies first in the cross-fertilization of our thinking by somewhat parallel thought of a different tradition. Peguy is thoroughly aware of the problem of history even though his methods of dealing with it may differ widely from ours. Secondly, Peguy's life and works represent a valuable criticism of secular socialism by one who has been through the mill and at the barricades, and who rather than reacting toward the right with a lessing of human sympathy became more profound in his realization of the issues involved. Finally, Peguy has a clarity of thought and an intellectual honesty which makes what he has to say speak from heart to heart rather than just from mind to mind.

CHARLES D. KEAN

●

THE ROAD TO SERFDOM. By Friedrich A. Hayek. University of Chicago Press, 1944. 250 pp. $2.75.

One of the most vivid experiences of this book is the opportunity it affords for shaking once again the unseen hand of Adam Smith. Many a reader who hates both communism and fascism will be amazed to find that the only tenable position he can hold is that of a nineteenth century liberal! It would be even more astounding if Hayek's point were proved.

The central thesis of the book is that "a directed economy must be run on more or less dictatorial lines...Power must rest in the hands of a commander-in-chief whose actions must not be fettered by democratic procedure." (p. 88) This means that socialism of all kinds (even religious socialism—p. 180) is just another means of defeating democracy and of bringing fascism to full strength. The nineteenth century liberal knows what the twentieth century liberal does not: namely, that competition "is the only method by which our activities can be adjusted to each other without coercieve or arbitrary intervention of authority." (p. 36) Competition can operate successfully only if it has the complete run of the field, and is in no way hindered by planning. In fact, Hayek goes so far as to say that "competition....cannot be combined with planning to any extent without ceasing to operate as an effective guide to production." (p. 52) Consequently, anything that endeavors to give conscious control or direction to our economic strucure will ultimately land us in the serfdom of Naziism and fascism or totalitarian communism. The only way to preserve personal freedom and individual responsibility is to keep all conscious control away from our productive mechanism and allow it to operate by "the laws of the market."

It has been a long-standing argument of twentieth century liberals that advance in technology has required planning since monopolies automatically destroy the competitive principle as an effective regulator. Hayek meets this argument by calling it a "deliberate myth." Although he admits monolopy as a fact, he claims that the "tendency toward monopoly and planning is not the result of any 'objective facts' beyond our control but the product of opinion fostered and propagated for half a century until they have come to dominate all our policy." (p. 43) These "opin-

oins" he later identifies as European socialist ideas that have been funnelled through Fichte and Marx. In other words, the A. T. & T. monopoly in the United States came about not because it was more efficient to handle telephone operations through one company, but rather it was due to the corrupting influence of foreign socialistic ideas in the minds of the A. T. & T. backers. The same, I take it, is true of the United States Steel Company that was nursed to life under the guiding hands of Marxist J. Pierpont Morgan and friends.

One is rather startled that so eminent an economist as the author of *Prices and Production* and *Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle* could so completely misread the history of monopolistic development. It may be true, although doubtful, that in the days before the Industrial Revolution, Say's Law of Markets was an adequate regulator of production and distribution. However, with modern technology demanding larger and larger aggregates of capital for production purposes, it seems absurd to claim that pure individualism is even a remote possibility. The idea that the modern monopolistic corporations grew as a result of socialistic ideas is too ridiculous to warrant serious consideration.

Hayek does not appear to understand that the issue is not between planlessness and planning, but rather between public or private planning. The modern corporation with its tremendous capital plans the use of that capital in such ways as to bring in the greatest possible revenue for its stockholders. The questions is not how it can obtain the greatest possible good for the social whole, but rather, how it can create the greatest possible profit for its investors. If the corporation can achieve its goal by exploiting its labor or by gouging the consumers, it should not, on individualist principles, refrain from either or both actions. The process by which the corporation performs its function effectively "plans" the lives of a large group of people. The planning, however, could hardly be called beneficial.

Nevertheless, there are some exceedingly cogent statements in this book regarding the dangers of concentrated power. Hayek is essentially correct when he points out that a *completely* planned economy would reduce human freedom to extinction. The communist planners who wish to destroy all areas within which competition can operate, and set up a centralized economic planning board, are certainly well on their way to totalitarianism. Although it is not absolutely true, there is at least a great deal of validity in Hilaire Belloc's statement that "the control of the production of wealth is the control of human life itself." Hayek is correct in pointing out that there are a great number of socialists who maintain the naive belief that once power is transferred from the tycoons of industry to the state, it will somehow lose its ability to corrupt its users. We should not lose sight of the truth involved in such statements as: "So long as property is divided among many owners, none of them acting independently has exclusive power to determine the income and position of particular people—nobody is tied to any one property owner except by the fact that he may offer better terms than anybody else." (p. 103)

This truth can be abstracted from Hayek's general thesis. It is perfectly possible to maintain that total planning is bad, and still advocate certain measures that will restrict the unbridled operation of competition. It is hardly pos-

sible to accept the idea that "the recent growth of monopoly is largely the result of a deliberate collaboration of organized capital and organized labor where the privileged groups of labor share in the monopoly profits at the expense of the community..." (p. 199) This is a ridiculous claim in the light of labor history in the United States with its lockouts and Mohawk Valley formulæ. Rather, we must recognize that there are certain "natural monopolies" and that these are vested with a definite public interest that can only be effectively controlled by a public agency. At the same time there are large areas in both production and distribution that can and should be under the regulation of competition. The existence of a government-operated Post Office system does not make competition in clothing impossible, any more than would government-operated power plants.

Hayek's major error comes from a misreading of economic history and a naive faith in Ricardian Natural Law. His emphasis on the necessity of preserving personal freedom and responsibility is excellent, but his defense is based on the shakiest of possible grounds. The book should be read, but read critically.

JOHN R. EVERETT

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THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS. Reinhold Niebuhr. A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense. New York, Scribner's 1944. 190 pp. $2.

This small book, as penetrating as it is brilliant and rich, is prompted by the concern lest democracy, being historically a product of middle-class thought and power, be drawn into the vortex of their decline.

The first chapter, which gives the book its title, expounds the thesis that it is the stupidity of children of light rather than any maliciousness of children of darkness which is responsible for the sorry plight in which modern civilization finds itself. The significance of this proposition is in the polemic against the Catholic misunderstanding of modern civilization as Satan's work. Middle-class liberalism and Marxian socialism are placed by the author on the side of light, because they do not deny a law higher than their will and interest. They seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law, either by competition or by common property and by planning. Their universalist objectives are not at fault, but their all too easy view of human nature is. They see an easy reconciliation of the particular and the universal interest, as in bourgeois pacificism and in the Marxian doctrine of a forceless age after common property is achieved. The children of light are more stupid than, but not as bad as, the children of darkness who make a cynical appraisal of, and adhere to, the forces of evil. Among the stupid children of light is the Catholic church herself, which also proved blind to the particular temptations of her position and thus prompted the downfall of her hardened medieval world.

The designation of stupid children of light gives a different, and more charitable, interpretation of those called, in the condemnatory language of orthodoxy, heretics. They are believers in God's justice, but are led astray by an inordinate reliance on the reasonableness of redeemed man, primarily their own reasonableness. Therefore they do not tremble at God's judgment nor feel

in need of His grace. From the point of view of Protestantism, the Catholic church comes under this verdict. As distinguished from the heretics, the apostates—called children of darkness or cynics by Niebuhr and exemplified by the Nazis—deny both the validity and the practicability of a spiritual goal. Niebuhr's terminology thus makes the decisive cut between the misguided and the evil. By laying most of the blame on the misguided good, he brings into sharp focus the spiritual frailty of moral man. At the same time, however, the moral guilt in their intellectual error tends to be glossed over as they are blamed for stupidity only. The "ideological" character of the liberal theory has been so fully expounded by its critics that it needs no further emphasis. Another case in point is the viciousness of all utterances of the classical theorists of socialism on the peasants, the Marxist belief in the stupidity and backwardness of agrarians, their incapability for any kind of organization, and their consequent need of being liberated by the proletarians instead of working out their own salvation. Inasmuch as Niebuhr subsumes also philosophical idealism under the same heading, one may refer to Fichte, who taught, not only that the German nation would be enabled by her, and his, philosophy to achieve a more perfect relationship to the community of mankind than any other nation, (this the author mentions), but also that the Germans are the only people worthy of the name because they are the only one to have a real language; the exclusiveness of this claim makes it pretty bad. Hence it may be doubted that it is an improvement to speak of stupidity rather than pretentiousness which inevitably goes with heresy.

One may also question the wisdom of Niebuhr's introducing the "will-to-live-truly" as the impulse of the good, and the "will-to-power" as that of the evil. They are both explained as spiritualized forms, peculiar to man, of the natural survival impulse, in opposite directions. The will-to-live-truly seeks self-giving as the fulfillment of the self in the lives of others. This terminology and distinction, whatever its merits, has the disadvantage of identifying power with the bad—which is the thesis of the various forms of pacifism, so brilliantly fought by the author on innumerable occasions and in the present book as well. It is characteristic that the author himself, throughout the rest of the book and most emphatically on page 47, has no use for this terminology but reverts to the more natural derivation of both good and evil impulses from dynamic vitality, which can also be called power, in a neutral sense of the word. Being created in the image of the Almighty, man has been given creative power, which includes the power to destroy for further and higher creation; man's freedom enables him to make inordinate use of this power. Without power, however, no positive work of peace and justice can be accomplished at all—this fundamental truth is somewhat obscured by the authors new terminology. This criticism does not affect the illuminating analyses of the frustration of all the lofty ideals of modern man by faulty judgment.

The danger in traditional democracy, we learn in Chapter II, is in its bourgeois individualism and its ignorance of the organic and essential nature of the community. This is exemplified by the various brands of social contract theories. It is a grave error to rest democracy on the liberty of the individual alone. The individual needs the community, to

which he is related on all the planes of their mutual existence, vital, organizational, and spiritual; and the community, in turn, must be kept open and flexible in order to leave room for its own potentialities, which must come from creative individuals and groups. A new truth may even ride into history on the back of an error; it is doubtful that the creative force of modern industry would have developed at all without the error of bourgeois individualism, or the personality rights of women without the abstract rationalism which defied the facts of nature in the relationship between the mother and the child. Marxism, which tore the veil of sanctity from the bourgeois individual, naively ignores the dangerous vitality in the community as such and assumes that the ruling group of a socialist society, in setting up plans, etc., only expresses what the multitude has conceived. The individual and the community must be related to each other so as to balance and check, but also support and inspire each other on every plane. Only on the ultimate highest plane the individual definitely transcends the community; the refined conscience finds its absolute yardstick for the measurement of individual and community life in God, who is beyond the relativities of any alleged sociological source of conscience.

This beautiful climax of the chapter, which definitely gives individual liberty the better of order in the community, should not conceal the fact that in the lower reaches of individual and community life, nearer the vital foundation, the community claims a predominance which is not easy to refute in theory, and impossible to resist in practice. For while physical life is not thinkable without a minimum of order in the community, it is thinkable, for quite some time, without individual liberty; when liberty and order appear irreconcilable, the more spiritual treasure of liberty is invariably sacrificed to the more vital need for security. This is the story of fascism, and it perfectly fits into the framework of Niebuhr's ideas.

These ideas on liberty as essential for the life of the community, not only of the individual, are not without precedent. They almost literally coincide with the oft-repeated analyses, in both French and English, by Georges Gurvitch and have been brilliantly epitomized by Karl Llewellyn's definition of democracy as "refreshment." That they are now presented and richly elaborated by Niebuhr, who no doubt conceived them independently, is a fortunate coincidence, particularly since they are brought, at his hands, to that religious climax.

Chapter III, on Community and Property, gives an extraordinarily enlightening survey of the modern property question, by using as its guiding thread the distinction between defensive and expansive forms of property. Originally the Christian justification of property is entirely defensive, as is the liberal theory; but the dynamics of modern technology have completely changed the nature of property into a means of expansive power and domination. Not only modern capitalist doctrine but even the papal encyclicals speak of property as if it were essentially unchanged. To this extent the Marxian understanding of the social nature of modern property is superior. But Marxism shares in the idyllic liberal belief in the essential harmlessness of property, that is, of collective property, whose grave social problems are concealed by its all-inclusive legal form; it is from the technical functioning of collective property that

a new stratification of functions and power arises. Thus Niebuhr is led to the exact position of Proudhon one hundred years ago (whom he quotes as a critic of private property only). He argues for a pragmatic solution of a problem which is insoluble on the plane of principle. Even the home, the most obviously defensive property, is beyond the reach of individual ownership in modern apartment houses. The only problem not included in the author's rich catalogue seems to be the opposite problem, that of small defensive shares in big corporations, such as the hundreds of thousands of owners of American Telegraph and Telephone and of the Pennsylvania Railroad; on this question the practice of the Nazi economy sheds some light. Also the new forms of individual ownership in homesteads involved on the Russian collectives present instructive new material.

Chapter IV, on Democratic Toleration and the Groups of the Community, leads to the thesis that democracy requires a humility which comes only from profound religion. This thesis is not quite new, but it is elaborated with a lucidity which makes it easily the climax of the book. For the liberal and Marxian children of light, who believe that history will produce uniformity of enlightened men and thus make democracy possible, destroy the pluralism of values which is historically, in the light of 17th century English history, the source of modern democracy. Modern Catholics, by insisting that the exclusive claims of the Church will never be practiced by practical men in a pluralist community, thereby admit the anti-democratic character of that claim. Even idealist teachings that one must inculcate concern for the other man's liberty rather than for the self, fail to realize the peril to democracy which comes from the fanaticism of moral idealists unconscious of the element of error and sin which creeps into the statement by man of even the sublimest truth.

It is fitting that the explanation of political universalism should conclude with a chapter on the world community. World community used to be a purely spiritual reality, a vision, a moral direction, but has now become, through technological developments, an imperative technical necessity, announced to mankind through two world wars in one generation. Moralists and constitutionalists think the solution of the problem is in a trick; they do not see the vastness of national and imperial vitalities which move through history. It is not government as such which produces unity and community on a national or international scale; what is required is particular forces, ethnic and cultural, to bind groups into a community—successfully achieved in the case of England and Scotland and completely frustrated between England and Ireland. No such cohesive forces are available for the world community; which leads to the dismal conclusion that peace will require more coercive force than is compatible with the necessities of justice, although too vexatious injustices are a threat to international order. For beside a common overtone of universalism in moral ideals, only the fear of anarchy—of war —binds the international community, and that fear is weaker than the fear of a common and concrete foe. To save the union was Lincoln's primary objective, even though that union was half slave and half free; it must be our objective on the international scale too. But it is true that Lincoln finally had to abolish slavery in order to preserve the union.

EDUARD HEIMANN

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